'원죄와 용서 그리고 유아세례'에 대한 어거스틴의 관점

MJT 12 (2001) 47-79

ORIGINAL SIN, INFANT SALVATION, AND

THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS

—A Critique of Some Contemporary Baptist Authors—

by J. Mark Beach

Introduction

IN REFORMED THINKING the covenant of grace forms the basis

for the practice of infant baptism. This practice, however, has

been much contested within Protestant theology, causing the

mercury on the theological thermometer to rise from time to

time. Heated polemics, of course, are not foreign to the topic of

infant baptism. Countless articles, treatises, books, and pamphlets

have been written in favor of and in opposition to the baptism of

infants. Certainly theologians and scholars have not lacked

resolve and conviction regarding this subject; nonetheless, no

unanimity has resulted as a consequence of nearly half a

millennium of polemics. Proponents from each side of the

debate have been unable to achieve a consensus among

Protestants regarding the proper subjects of baptism. The issue

remains a cause for division.

Thus, after nearly five hundred years of debate, some

theologians are pleading for a truce within the evangelical church.

Wayne Grudem, for example, while himself arguing vigorously

for believer’s baptism, does not think baptism ought to be a

point of division among churches. He suggests that paedobaptists

and advocates of believer’s baptism jointly acknowledge that

“baptism is not a major doctrine of the faith.” Grudem

recognizes that this would require concessions on the part of

48 • MID-AMERICA JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

Baptists and paedobaptists alike so that both views of baptism

could be “taught and practiced” in their respective churches. ¹

Grudem’s suggestion comes, as noted above, after he has

waged his own polemic against infant baptism. While his desire

to see greater unity in the evangelical church is highly

commendable, especially since evangelicals hold so much in

common confessionally, Grudem’s plea for accommodating (or

tolerating) one another’s theology and practice reflects a doctrine

of baptism that must be challenged. In other words, in

advocating that Baptist and paedobaptist churches agree to

disagree regarding the theology and practice of infant baptism,

and even agree to permit one another’s theology and practice of

baptism within the same ecclesiastical circle, Grudem shows that

he is ready to underrate baptism’s place and importance.

Consequently, while Grudem’s plea is attractive, it fundamentally

misunderstands the doctrine of infant baptism that was given

confessional shape among the Reformed during the Protestant

Reformation. What is more, other recent Baptist theologians

have sounded a different note regarding the permissibility of

infant baptism and the necessity of believer’s baptism.

Stanley J. Grenz, in offering what we might call a distillation

of the Baptist assessment of infant baptism, notes that

proponents of believer’s baptism “reject infant baptism as an

inferior, even dangerous, practice.” Since infants lack personal

conscious faith, the rite either comes to a meaningless “baby

dedication” or “is inflated to a regenerative act which encourages

confidence in baptism rather than in Christ.” Moreover, infant

baptism is deemed to be “harmful,” for it does not allow the

child to make use of “the divinely ordained means of declaring

conscious and responsible belief in Jesus Christ later in life.” The

“dangerous” character of infant baptism is also evident in the

phenomenon of “a national church which extends the boundaries

of the faith community to the political boundaries of the land.”²

¹Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine

(Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House; Leicester, England: Inter-

Varsity Press, 1994), 982.

²Stanley J. Grenz, Theology for the Community of God (1994; repr., Grand

ORIGINAL SIN, INFANT SALVATION, AND THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS • 49

Rhetoric of this sort, with words like “dangerous” and

“harmful,” hardly represents a softening of the polemic or an

openness to accommodate diverse perspectives pertaining to the

baptism of infants. It is apparent that not all advocates of

believer’s baptism are prepared to make their peace with the

paedobaptist position. Likewise from the Reformed side,

paedobaptists have not historically been of the conviction that

the baptism of covenant children is optional. On the contrary,

historic Reformed practice argued not merely for the

permissibility of infant baptism but for its necessity. As G. C.

Berkouwer notes, “the practice of infant baptism rests upon a

definite confession.”³This is reflected, for example, in the old

Dutch Reformed “Form for the Baptism of Infants.” In this

Form believing parents acknowledge that their children are sinful

from conception and birth and are therefore subject to all

manner of misery, even eternal condemnation; yet, as recipients

of the divine promise of grace, they are “sanctified in Christ” and

so as “members of His Church ought to be baptized.”⁴

Since this is so, Baptists and paedobaptists are faced with the

temptation simply to agree to disagree and go their separate ways.

A better avenue seems open to us, however, and that is frankly to

acknowledge how far apart advocates of believer’s baptism and

infant baptism remain, while attempting to explore and clarify the

debate.

This leads us to inquire into the status of the debate. What

precisely is the hinge upon which the disagreement pivots? Is

there any possibility of narrowing the gap between these two

positions in a manner other than Grudem’s proposal of mutual

toleration?

In an attempt to clarify and continue the discussion we do

well to examine the shape of the current consensus against infant

baptism among evangelical-Baptist theologians in North

Rapids: Eerdmans, Vancouver: Regent College Publishing, 2000), 528-529.

³G. C. Berkouwer, The Sacraments, trans. Hugo Beker (Grand Rapids:

Eerdmans, 1969), 161.

⁴Quote taken from appended pages of Psalter Hymnal (Grand Rapids: Board

of Publications of the Christian Reformed Church, 1976), 125; italics added.

50 • MID-AMERICA JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

America. More specifically, we do well to examine a facet of the

debate that is often neglected, namely, the role that the doctrine

of original sin plays in determining the status of infants and

children—both the children of believers and unbelievers—which

in turn has direct implications concerning the proper subjects of

baptism. I maintain that the doctrine of original sin has

significant implications for the assessment of infant baptism. In

other words, the theological pre-commitment on the nature and

scope of original sin and who therefore may be reckoned as

participants in Adam’s sin plays an important role in how both

opponents and proponents of infant baptism “size up” the

Scriptural evidence for the practice of baptizing children. In

short, the doctrine of infant baptism is intimately connected to

the doctrine of original sin. The current evangelical-Baptist

consensus in opposition to the traditional formulation of the

doctrine of original sin significantly downplays the effects of

original sin upon infants and all others who have not reached a

state of moral accountability. What this means for the issue of

infant baptism is that children, before reaching an age of moral

accountability, are not reckoned in strict need of the redemption

that baptism symbolizes.

However, if either the classical, broadly Augustinian

conception or the federalist scheme of original sin is valid, such

that even infants are corrupted and guilty in Adam’s sin, then

they too, even as infants, stand in need of Christ’s redemptive

work as those who are guilty and condemnable in God’s eyes.

Thus in opposition to the current Baptist consensus, the

Reformed understanding of original sin maintains that infants are

dirty and need to be washed in the blood of Christ—even as they

are guilty and need to be justified by Christ’s perfect sacrifice and

active obedience in fulfillment of the law. Consequently, insofar

as a certain class of infants are indubitably the objects of divine

redemption, the sign and seal of that redemption—baptism—

ought to be administered to them. Of course, in this connection

baptism’s import looms large on the horizon of debate.

The argument of this essay will proceed in the following

manner: First I shall present in outline the Baptist consensus

ORIGINAL SIN, INFANT SALVATION, AND THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS • 51

against the baptism of infants. Next I shall consider the rejection

of the doctrine of original guilt that forms a part of that

consensus—a rejection that paves the way for a doctrine of

infant salvation. This discussion is followed by a brief analysis of

how the denial of inherited guilt coincides with the rejection of

infant baptism. Finally I shall offer an extensive critique of the

evangelical-Baptist consensus on original sin and infant salvation,

and its dismissal of infant baptism. In particular I shall argue that

any doctrine of infant salvation which bypasses the necessity and

fullness of Christ’s redemptive work is contrary to Scripture and

must be rejected. I also argue that all humans—whether young or

old, mentally handicapped or of sound mind—reach eternal

blessedness only through Christ’s full redemptive work on the

cross and the Spirit’s renewing operation. From that perspective,

I also argue that the sign of salvation may not be separated from

the thing signified, which is to say, if one participates in the

reality of salvation he or she must receive the sign of that

salvation—the mark of baptism.

An Outline of the Evangelical-Baptist Consensus

against the Baptism of Infants

In considering the treatment of baptism among

contemporary evangelical-Baptist authors, I will be examining the

works of the following theologians: Millard J. Erikson’s Christian

Theology,⁵Gordon R. Lewis and Bruce A. Demarest’s Integrative

Theology: Historical, Biblical, Systematic, Apologetic, Practical,⁶and

Stanley J. Grenz’s Theology for the Community of God.⁷While

⁵Millard J. Erickson, Christian Theology, 2^nded. (Grand Rapids: Baker Books,

1998).

⁶Gordon R. Lewis & Bruce A. Demarest, Integrative Theology: Historical,

Biblical, Systematic, Apologetic, Practical. Three volumes in one (Grand Rapids:

Zondervan Publishing House, 1996).

⁷Stanley J. Grenz, Theology for the Community of God (1994; repr., Grand

Rapids: Eerdmans., Vancouver: Regent College Publishing, 2000). Interest-

ingly, in his Systematic Theology, Wayne Grudem, another contemporary

evangelical-Baptist author, follows a more traditional Augustinian doctrine of

original sin and therefore a trajectory distinct from these other writers; see his

52 • MID-AMERICA JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

complete unanimity cannot be found among these writers on all

issues pertaining to baptism, it is fair to say that together they

represent a major consensus among proponents of believer’s

baptism. What follows is a distillation of their arguments against

infant baptism, gleaned from their own polemics as well as the

sources they cite in defense of their position.⁸

In summary form, the baptism of infants is impermissible for

the following reasons: (1) Practitioners of infant baptism

fundamentally misconceive and misconstrue the nature and import of

baptism; consequently, in allowing infants to be baptized, the

proponents of this custom misuse the ordinance that Christ

ordained for the benefit of believers.⁹(2) The New Testament witness

is silent on the question of infant baptism, evident in that not a

single instance of the practice can be adduced for its support,

including the texts that describe household baptisms.¹⁰(3) The

key New Testament texts that paedobaptists cite in support of the

baptism of infants simply are not applicable, including the often

vague appeal to the covenant of grace and the continuity that

allegedly exists between the Old and the New Testaments on the

nature and place of children in the covenant community.¹¹(4)

The sequence for the operation of salvation that prevails in the

New Testament is contrary to the theology and practice of

baptizing infants, for that sequence consists of gospel preaching,

the hearing of gospel preaching, confession of faith, and then

water baptism. Since infants are incapable of the requisite faith,

their baptism is premature and inappropriate. The membership

Systematic Theology, 494-501.

⁸For part of this list I have adapted the synopsis of James Leo Garrett,

Systematic Theology: Biblical, Historical, and Evangelical, 2 vols. (Grand Rapids:

William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1990, 1995), II:526-528.

⁹See Grenz, Theology for the Community of God, 529; Lewis and Demarest,

Integrative Theology, III:288; Erickson, Christian Theology, 2^nded., 1105-1106; also

Grudem, Systematic Theology, 978-79.

¹⁰See Garrett, Systematic Theology, II:526; Grenz, Theology for the Community of

God, 528; Lewis and Demarest, Integrative Theology, III:289; Erickson, Christian

Theology, 2^nded., 1111-1112; Grudem, Systematic Theology, 978.

¹¹See Garrett, Systematic Theology, II:527; Lewis and Demarest, Integrative

Theology, III:288; Erickson, Christian Theology, 2^nded., 1112; Grudem, Systematic

Theology, 976-77.

ORIGINAL SIN, INFANT SALVATION, AND THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS • 53

of the church must respect this sequence, for only those are

members of Christ and of his church who are united to him by

credible faith.¹²(5) The case for believer’s baptism does not depend

upon mere occasions or instances of baptism recorded for us in

the New Testament. Rather, it is determined by the wider and

broader scope of the New Testament witness as such—that is, it

rests upon “New Testament theology.” Thus Christ’s person and

work, the church’s nature and function, as well as the

eschatological significance of salvation in its entire scope must

come into play as we consider the doctrine of baptism and see

the support for believer’s baptism in opposition to infant

baptism.¹³(6) The practical consequences of infant baptism are often

harmful, leading the recipients of infant baptism to presume that

they are regenerate and do not need seriously to consider their

spiritual state before God. Consequently, over time, the church is

crippled by unbelief. Moreover, another practical consequence of

the baptism of infants is that it easily links up with the idea of a

national church (a Volkskirche) wherein the boundaries of the

church are inclusive of all the citizenry of the state. The church is

thus infected with nominal religion, since a large segment of the

baptized population in such a circumstance tends not to worship

God or live the new life in Christ which baptism, rightly

conceived, symbolizes.¹⁴(7) Infant baptism is inordinately and

needlessly linked to a doctrine of original guilt. In the early

centuries of the church the baptism of infants was a “practice in

search of a theology,” with the consequence that a theology of

original sin, which imputed the guilt of Adam’s first sin to infants

so that they share in eternal damnation, needed a theology of

¹²See Garrett, Systematic Theology, II:526-27; Grudem, Systematic Theology, 969-

70; G. R. Beasley-Murray, Baptism in the New Testament. W. T. Whitley

Lectureship, 1962, American Paperback Edition (1973; reprint edition, Grand

Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 272, 274.

¹³See Garrett, Systematic Theology, II:528.

¹⁴See Garrett, Systematic Theology, II:527; Grenz, Theology for the Community of

God, 529; Lewis and Demarest, Integrative Theology, III:288-89; Grudem,

Systematic Theology, 980.

54 • MID-AMERICA JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

baptism that delivered infants from that guilt and its

consequences.¹⁵

This list of arguments constitutes quite a polemic against

baptizing infants. Of course, numerous Reformed responses to

such arguments are within easy reach.¹⁶Our purpose here is not

to engage each of these theses, except for the last and, in some

respects, the most decisive one, the argument that infant baptism

is inappropriately linked to the doctrine of original sin. This

argument is particularly curious in view of the consensus that can

be discerned among evangelical-Baptist writers regarding the

doctrine of infant salvation, or more specifically, the doctrine that

affirms the salvation of all persons who die in infancy or before

reaching a state of accountability. We wish to subject this

doctrine to analysis and critique, particularly as it forms part of

the Baptist polemic against the baptism of infants.

¹⁵See Garrett, Systematic Theology, II:527.

¹⁶See B. B. Warfield’s response over a century ago to the arguments of

Augustus Hopkins Strong, entitled “The Polemics of Infant Baptism,” The

Works of Benjamin B. Warfield, vol. 9, Studies in Theology (1932; repr., Grand

Rapids: Baker Books, 1991), 398-408. Warfield offers a cogent rebuttal to

Strong, and many of his polemical arrows hit the target of the criticisms

summarized above. Also see G. C. Berkouwer, The Sacraments, 161-187;

Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, 3 vols. (1871-1873; repr., Grand Rapids:

Eerdmans, 1981), III, 546-579; Robert Dabney, Lectures in Systematic Theology

(1927; repr., Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1985), 777-799; Louis

Berkhof, Systematic Theology (1939, 1941), 631-643; Wilhelmus à Brakel, The

Christian’s Reasonable Service, 4 vols., trans. Bartel Elshout (Ligonier, PA: Soli

Deo Gloria Publications, 1993), II:504-511; John Murray, Christian Baptism

(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1980), 45-82; H. Westerink, A Sign of Faithfulness:

Covenant and Baptism, trans. J. Mark Beach (Neerlandia, Alberta; Pella, Iowa:

Inheritance Publications, 1997); Pierre Ch. Marcel, The Biblical Doctrine of Infant

Baptism, trans. P. E. Hughes (London: James Clarke & Co., 1953), 187-245;

John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 2 vols., ed. John T. McNeill, trans.

Ford Lewis Battles (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1960), IV.16.1-32.

ORIGINAL SIN, INFANT SALVATION, AND THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS • 55

The Evangelical-Baptist Consensus Regarding

Original Sin and Infant Salvation

In setting forth his doctrine of original sin, Millard Erickson

begins by arguing for a realist conception or what he terms the

“natural headship of Adam.” Humans participate in Adam’s sin

by being “actually present within Adam.” This means that “we all

sinned in his act.” Erickson believes this scheme solves the

problem of alien guilt and answers the charge of injustice, for we

sin with Adam.¹⁷

Yet a problem remains. What is the condition of infants and

children? If his realist conception of original sin is correct, this

implies that all persons—including infants and children—are

born with a corrupted nature and reckoned guilty in being sinners

with Adam. This brings Erickson to consider whether children

who die in infancy, before they make a conscious decision of

faith, are lost and condemned to eternal death. At this point his

doctrine of original sin softens: “While the status of infants and

those who never reach moral competence is a difficult question,

it appears that our Lord did not regard them as under

condemnation.” This means that all those who fail to attain an

age of moral competence are exempted from the guilt and

consequent condemnation that is part of original sin. In fact,

Erickson argues that Jesus held little children up as an example of

the type of person who will inherit the kingdom of God (Matt.

18:3; 19:14), meaning they are free from the guilt and eternal

penalty of original sin. Erickson also appeals to 2 Samuel 12:23,

wherein David expresses confidence that he would again see his

child who had died. “On the basis of such considerations,” writes

Erickson, “it is difficult to maintain that children are to be

thought of as sinful, condemned, and lost.”¹⁸

Erickson maintains that in taking this position he is not being

“sentimental.” On the contrary, he believes this position is

biblically required, for Scripture tells us that “persons are not

morally responsible before a certain point, which we sometimes

¹⁷Erickson, Christian Theology, 2^nded., 654.

¹⁸Erickson, Christian Theology, 2^nded., 654.

56 • MID-AMERICA JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

call ‘the age of accountability’.”¹⁹Erickson offers the following

arguments in support of this idea:

In Deuteronomy 1:39, Moses says, ‘And the little ones that you

said would be taken captive, your children who do not yet know

good from bad—they will enter the land. I will give it to them

and they will take possession of it.’ Even with the Hebrew idea

of corporate personality and corporate responsibility, these

children were not held responsible for the sins of Israel. In the

messianic prophecy in Isaiah 7, there are two references to the

time when the boy ‘knows enough to reject the wrong and

choose the right’ (vv. 15, 16). Finally, Jonah quotes God as

saying, ‘But Nineveh has more than a hundred and twenty

thousand people who cannot tell their right hand from their left,

and many cattle as well. Should I not be concerned about that

great city?’ (4:11). Although this is less clear, it appears from the

context that the reference is to the ability to distinguish morally.

Underlying these statements is the apparent fact that prior to a

certain point in life, there is no moral responsibility, because

there is no awareness of right and wrong.²⁰

Erickson further argues that just as Christ’s righteousness is

not imputed to believers without a conscious act of faith—

otherwise all would automatically be saved—so the imputation of

Adam’s guilt requires “some sort of volitional choice as well.” If

“unconscious sin” is valid, then “unconscious faith” is valid.

Both notions are dubious in Erickson’s mind.²¹As for children

who die in infancy or an early age, despite their participation in

Adam’s sin, “they are somehow accepted and saved.” The

“spiritual effects” of the original curse are canceled out in their

case inasmuch as they have made no conscious choice of Adam’s

sin. Referring to the parallelism between Adam and Christ in

Romans 5, Erickson asserts that while some theological

constructions preserve this parallelism “by allowing both

unconscious or unconditional imputation of Adam’s guilt and

¹⁹Erickson, Christian Theology, 2^nded., 654.

²⁰Erickson, Christian Theology, 2^nded., 654-655.

²¹Erickson, Christian Theology, 2^nded., 655.

ORIGINAL SIN, INFANT SALVATION, AND THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS • 57

Christ’s righteousness,” he believes an alternative construction is

preferable.²²

The current form of my understanding is as follows: We all were

involved in Adam’s sin, and thus receive both the corrupted

nature that was his after the fall, and the guilt and condemnation

that attach to his sin. With this matter of guilt, however, just as

with the imputation of Christ’s righteousness, there must be

some conscious and voluntary decision on our part. Until this is

the case, there is only a conditional imputation of guilt. Thus,

there is no condemnation until one reaches the age of

responsibility. If a child dies before becoming capable of making

genuine moral decisions, the contingent imputation of Adamic

sin does not become actual, and the child will experience the

same type of future existence with the Lord as will those who

have reached the age of moral responsibility and had their sins

forgiven as a result of accepting the offer of salvation based

upon Christ’s atoning death. The problem of the corrupted

nature of such persons is presumably dealt with in the way that

the imperfectly sanctified nature of believers will be glorified.²³

For Erickson, then, our voluntary decision ends our childish

innocence and constitutes a ratification of the first sin of the fall.

Wishing however to avoid the Arminian view which postpones

the imputation of the first sin until we commit a sin of our own,

whereby we ratify Adam’s first sin so that it is imputed to us,

Erickson aims to preserve the parallelism between our accepting

the work of Christ and that of Adam, while simultaneously

affirming our responsibility for the first sin. “We become

responsible and guilty,” says Erickson, “when we accept or

approve of our corrupt nature.” Upon recognition of “our own

tendency toward sin,” we can either repent of it and seek divine

forgiveness, or we can acquiesce in it and in effect embrace the

sinful nature. “By placing our tacit approval upon the corruption,

we are also approving or concurring in the action in the Garden

of Eden so long ago.” This means that “we become guilty of that

²²Erickson, Christian Theology, 2^nded., 655-656.

²³Erickson, Christian Theology, 2^nded., 656.

58 • MID-AMERICA JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

sin without having committed any sin of our own.”²⁴Thus guilt

attaches itself to corruption along the path of personal sin.

Retroactively, upon a personal and morally responsible act of

transgression, original guilt is imputed to the sinner.

In their joint work entitled Integrative Theology, Gordon R.

Lewis and Bruce A. Demarest also address the topic of original

sin and the baptism of infants. Lewis and Demarest, like

Erickson, affirm original sin, with a doctrine of depravity, and the

solidarity of guilt.²⁵They conceive of this solidarity in the way of

“realism,” for humans are a single race and Adam’s natural

headship is presupposed in the theological argument of Romans

5.²⁶However, in defining the grounds of judgment, guilt, and

punishment, Lewis and Demarest, again like Erickson, do not

affirm a doctrine of imputed guilt but focus upon personal

rebellion, for all are “accountable for breaking faith with the

Creator.” “Before God himself we find ourselves repeatedly

guilty of illicit desires, relationships, words, and acts.”²⁷

Having said this, Lewis and Demarest likewise (as an

inevitability) raise the question regarding the moral and legal

standing of children who die in infancy. They observe that

children born of flesh are flesh (John 3:6; cf. Ps. 51:5; Eph. 2:3).

Moreover, such children are included in the universal curse that

God placed upon humanity in Adam (Rom. 5:16, 18) and

consequently they physically die (v. 12). “Nevertheless infants

who die do not suffer the eternal penalty, for that penalty falls only

on those who themselves responsibly sin.”²⁸

In defense of this position Lewis and Demarest argue that

whereas the parents who sinned during the wilderness journey

died without entering the Promised Land as a consequence of

their sin, the children, not yet being morally responsible, did not

²⁴Erickson, Christian Theology, 2^nded., 656.

²⁵Gordon R. Lewis & Bruce A. Demarest, Integrative Theology, II:208-222,

especially pages 214-15, 218-19.

²⁶Lewis and Demarest, Integrative Theology, II:221-222.

²⁷Lewis and Demarest, Integrative Theology, II:221.

²⁸Lewis and Demarest, Integrative Theology, II:223.

ORIGINAL SIN, INFANT SALVATION, AND THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS • 59

undergo their parents’ penalty; instead, they entered the land of

promise (Deut. 1:39).

The age of responsibility here indicated was twenty years for

inclusion in the census of adult citizens (Num. 14:29-31). Other

passages show that children may suffer the natural consequences

of their parents’ sin until the third and fourth generations (Exod.

20:5; 34:7), but their spiritual relation to God, whether good or

bad, was not determined by their parents. ‘The soul who sins is

the one who will die’ (Ezek. 18:20). Children are not capable of

responsibly committing the sins attributed to those who eternally

alienate themselves from God. For reasons like these, minors

who die before reaching moral accountability, will not suffer the

execution of the penalty of imputed condemnation.²⁹

Since infants are incapable of repentance and faith, they

cannot take hold of the benefits of Christ’s atoning work except

by way of “special application.” Lewis and Demarest argue that

this does not constitute a “different ground of salvation,” though

it does entail a “different mode of application.” They accent the

fact that in Scripture punishment is always according to merit and

befits the crime. Children who die in infancy therefore do not

suffer eternal punishment for their parents’ sins. “The eternal

welfare of each soul is determined by itself irregardless [sic] of

whether the parents were wicked or good (Ezek. 18).” What this

comes to in Lewis and Demarest’s analysis is that, though infants

are “under the sentence of eternal death” inasmuch as they share

solidarity with the human race, they will not suffer eternally since

they “have not themselves responsibly sinned.”³⁰

Lewis and Demarest also appeal to Matthew 18:2-14 and

19:14.

[A]lthough these passages are not as explicit as we might like,

they may justify a special application of the provisions of Christ’s

atonement to children. Since they have not responsibly

committed any sins and have no sins of which to repent, and

since they could not consciously believe on Christ to deliver

²⁹Lewis and Demarest, Integrative Theology, II:223.

³⁰Lewis and Demarest, Integrative Theology, II:223.

60 • MID-AMERICA JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

them from their innate inclination to sin, surely Christ will

pardon them of their sinful natures and welcome them to his

kingdom, whether or not the parents are in the covenant,

whether or not they have had the child undergo infant baptism

or last rites.³¹

Children who die in infancy, indeed all those who fail to attain a

state of moral accountability, stand justified and are forgiven their

inherited inclination to commit sin. Infant death therefore is

indicative of divine election.³²

Stanley Grenz is another author whose doctrine of original

sin does not fit within classically Reformed theological categories.

In considering what he calls “the Reformed view” of original sin,

a doctrine that entails the idea that all Adam’s offspring inherit

both a depraved nature and actual guilt, Grenz challenges the

Reformed exegesis of Ephesians 2:3 and Romans 5:12-21. Grenz

argues that the phrase in Ephesians 2:3 “by nature children of

wrath” is better translated “by nature wrathful children,” so that

what the apostle teaches in this verse is not that Adam’s offspring

are guilty with Adam’s sin but all humans are by nature “wrathful

people.”³³Grenz also challenges the Reformed understanding of

Romans 5:12-21. Inasmuch as Paul affirms “the universality of

sin” through Adam’s disobedience and “the divine solution”

through the obedience of Christ, making “righteousness

available,” the apostle’s point is that “Adam and Christ are

similar because the results of their actions affect us.” However,

according to Grenz, Paul does not conceive of humankind as

particular individuals whose volitional actions determine their

destiny. Instead he conceives of humanity as a single entity. “Into

his mass of humanity Adam’s act injected sin as a power or force

hostile to God, which in turn brings the reign of death.” In

contrast to this, Christ’s obedience “injected righteousness as a

power and with it the reign of life.” What is left unanswered in

Romans 5, argues Grenz, is how individual persons participate in

Adam’s sin and Christ’s obedience. Grenz is concerned to

³¹Lewis and Demarest, Integrative Theology, II:223.

³²Lewis and Demarest, Integrative Theology, II:223-224.

³³Stanley J. Grenz, Theology for the Community of God , 203-204.

ORIGINAL SIN, INFANT SALVATION, AND THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS • 61

maintain the parallelism between Adam and Christ. “If Adam’s

guilt is imputed to all, then fairness demands that Christ’s

righteousness be as well.”³⁴The answer actually comes elsewhere

in the Epistle where the apostle makes clear that God bestows

righteousness on those united to Christ by faith. Similarly,

individuals come under the power of death—the death

introduced into the world by Adam’s sin—through their own

“personal sin.” Grenz thus concludes that the case for “original

guilt” is not strong.³⁵

Grenz does affirm original sin in the sense of inherited

corruption or depravity. He likens our inheriting of a depraved

nature with our inheriting of other basic traits; in fact, they come

to us in the same way. Wishing to steer clear of a purely Pelagian

notion of original sin, Grenz states that the source of our sinful

nature is not limited to the external environment; rather, our

sinful attitudes and actions spring forth from “the inner core of

our being, from the human heart.” Meanwhile we derive our

corrupt nature from our ancestors, going back to our first

parents. Yet Grenz also wishes to recognize a social factor: “We

teach each other to sin.”³⁶Thus, given both of these factors,

“Each of us will and does sin, once we are in a position to reflect

moral choices in action and thereby to act out what is present

within our nature by heredity and socialization.”³⁷

For Grenz, however, guilt is not part of what constitutes

original sin, which is to say, depravity alone is not indicative of

guilt and condemnation. Scripture declares that God judges us

according to our works (Jer. 17:9-10; Rom. 2:6), which means we

are not condemned for a fallen nature but for sinful actions.

Indeed, all humans miss the mark either willfully or passively.³⁸

The question still remains as to the time and point at which

each individual actually begins to participate in humanity’s

common failure. The best response, according to Grenz, is one

³⁴Grenz, Theology for the Community of God, 204-205.

³⁵Grenz, Theology for the Community of God, 205.

³⁶Grenz, Theology for the Community of God, 205.

³⁷Grenz, Theology for the Community of God, 206.

³⁸Grenz, Theology for the Community of God, 206.

62 • MID-AMERICA JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

that realizes the potential present in all persons even from

infancy to partake in the break-down of community, although the

egocentric and self-absorbed survival characteristics of infancy do

not entail “guilt.” This is not to say, however, that “the self-

absorption of infancy” cannot ripen into “a community-

destructive force within each of us—a depraved nature.” The

inevitable consequence is that “this depraved nature expresses

itself in moral choices that are either overly egotistical or overly

self-abasing, and hence are displeasing to God.”³⁹

Grenz also queries whether the idea of condemnation can

apply to persons who have not come through the process of

normal human development, such as infants and the severely

mentally retarded. He argues that only “our works” will form the

basis for the final verdict.⁴⁰

Consequently, although all persons inherit a sinful disposition,

only those who have given expression to the fallen nature

through wrong moral choices stand under condemnation. The

sentence falls only on those whose deeds mark them as guilty.

On this basis, we conclude that persons who do not develop the

moral potential do not fall under the eternal condemnation of

the righteous God.⁴¹

This fits with Jesus’ declaration that the kingdom belongs to

children (Matt. 18:1-14; 19:14), for children are still in the stage

of innocency and not yet in the stage of responsibility.

“Somewhere in childhood we move from a stage in which our

actions are not deemed morally accountable to the responsibility

of acting as moral agents. In short, we cross a point which some

refer to as the ‘age of accountability’.”⁴²Following A. H. Strong,

Grenz acknowledges that infants are in a state of sin and need to

be regenerated. What this means is that those who die in infancy,

according to Strong, “are the object of special divine compassion

³⁹Grenz, Theology for the Community of God, 206.

⁴⁰Grenz, Theology for the Community of God, 208-209.

⁴¹Grenz, Theology for the Community of God, 209.

⁴²Grenz, Theology for the Community of God, 209. Grenz cites Deut. 1:39,

Num. 14:29-31, and Isa. 7:15-16.

ORIGINAL SIN, INFANT SALVATION, AND THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS • 63

and care, and through the grace of Christ are certain of

salvation.”⁴³

We see then that for Grenz, as with Erickson and Lewis and

Demarest, all persons who do not come to an age or mental state

of accountability are not reckoned guilty in Adam’s sin, for

though they inherit corruption and are inclined to sin, they do

not inherit original guilt and have not committed a sinful act for

which they are accountable. All such persons are therefore the

objects of a distinctive sort of divine grace, coming to eternal

blessedness through God’s peculiar saving actions.

The Denial of Inherited Guilt and the Rejection

of Infant Baptism

The notion of original sin as set forth by these evangelical-

Baptist authors has direct implications for the doctrine of

baptism in general and infant baptism in particular. Given their

rejection of original guilt (infants being infected only with an

inherited pollution), it is not surprising that the Reformed

doctrine of infant baptism is adjudged biblically out-of-bounds.

Of course, the question of the meaning of baptism plays a

significant role in the assessment of infant baptism as well. More

will be said about that below. Here I observe that if infants and

children, and more particularly, if the infants and children of

believers, are considered to be without guilt, standing in no need

of the remission of sin, indeed, having no sin of their own and in

no way culpable with Adam, then the symbol of baptism (even as

defined by Reformed writers) cannot legitimately be administered

to them.⁴⁴It is nonsensical to administer the sign of baptism,

signifying the washing away of sins, where no sin exists. Those

⁴³Augustus Hopkins Strong, Systematic Theology, 3 vols. (Philadelphia:

Griffith and Rowland, 1907), 2:661.

⁴⁴It would seem that the mark of circumcision, prescribed in the Old

Testament, is likewise misapplied if administered to “guiltless” children. On

the import of circumcision, see John Murray, Christian Baptism, 44-48; and

especially O. Palmer Robertson, The Christ of the Covenants (Phillipsburg, NJ:

P&R, 1980), 147-166.

64 • MID-AMERICA JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

who are not (yet) sinners do not qualify as candidates for full

redemption. Consequently, they likewise do not qualify as

candidates for the sign of that full redemption, namely baptism.

Indeed, the symbol of washing is inappropriate for those who are

not dirty.

Baptist authors, however, typically assign a meaning to

baptism that subverts the divine testimony and promissory

character of the sacrament. Lewis and Demarest offer this

comprehensive definition:

(1) Ontologically, baptism signifies that the Holy Spirit has already

renewed the human spirit’s capacities to know, love, and serve

God. (2) Intellectually, baptism declares one’s assent to the

Gospel’s objective truth for all and one’s subjective reception of

it as true personally. (3) Volitionally, baptism manifests the

person’s entire soul commitment to the crucified and risen

Messiah. (4) Emotionally, baptism expresses one’s deep desire to

love God with one’s whole being. (5) Ethically, baptism marks the

transfer of one’s ultimate loyalty from the kingdom of darkness

to the kingdom of light and to Christ as King. (6) Relationally, by

being baptized, a person gives visible testimony to an invisible

communion with the crucified and exalted Christ and to other

members of the institution Christ heads, universally and locally.

Through baptism a person expresses an initial public acceptance

of both the privileges and the responsibilities of membership in

that church.⁴⁵

Another contemporary Baptist author defines baptism as

follows: Baptism is “the sign of the believer’s identification with

the death, burial, and resurrection of Jesus; the outward sign of

an inner cleansing or of the remission of sins; the sign of the

eschatological resurrection of believers; the sign of the believer’s

entry into the body of Christ; a testimony both to believers and

to nonbelievers; and an act of obedience to Jesus Christ.”⁴⁶What

is fundamental here is the conviction that baptism is a “token” or

“an outward symbol”—serving as “a public testimony”—of what

God has already effected in the person who believes in Jesus

⁴⁵Lewis and Demarest, Integrative Theology, II:286.

⁴⁶Garrett, Systematic Theology, II:529.

ORIGINAL SIN, INFANT SALVATION, AND THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS • 65

Christ.⁴⁷It “is the God-given means whereby we initially declare

publicly our inward faith.”⁴⁸As a public testimony of rebirth, it is

fitting that this sign should be reserved “for those who give

evidence that that is actually true in their lives.”⁴⁹

What must not be missed in these definitions is that baptism

is fundamentally a human testimony—it is the sign of the believer’s

identification with Christ; baptism declares the believer’s assent to

the gospel; it manifests the believer’s entire soul commitment to the

risen Messiah; it marks the transfer of the believer’s loyalty from

darkness to light; the believer gives visible testimony to an invisible

communion with the Lord and offers an initial public acceptance

of the duties of church membership. In short, baptism is the

believer’s activity, an activity infants are incapable of performing.

We see then that when baptism is defined in this way, infants

are automatically disqualified as the proper recipients of the

symbol. Indeed, by consigning the “ordinance” of baptism to a

species of human testimony, coupled with an emasculated

doctrine of original sin, the idea of infant baptism is rendered

both unnecessary and ridiculous. But this scheme, in affirming

the salvation of infants while despising the baptism of infants,

meets with its own serious problems, as will become evident in

what follows.

Critique of the Evangelical-Baptist Consensus on

Original Sin and Infant Salvation

In the foregoing we have seen that, according to the

consensus formed by these evangelical-Baptist writers, infants

and others who have not attained the status of moral

accountability participate in Adam’s sin in an attenuated manner,

being infected with a corrupt nature but free from the guilt of

Adam’s first sin. Since such persons are guiltless, they are under

no penalty of sin, yet they still need deliverance from their

inherited sinful condition. The Spirit’s regenerative operation is

⁴⁷Erickson, Christian Theology, 2^nded., 1105.

⁴⁸Grenz, Theology for the Community of God, 529.

⁴⁹Grudem, Systematic Theology, 979.

66 • MID-AMERICA JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

therefore necessary. Strictly speaking, however, the recipients of

this restorative action are sinful only in being inclined to commit

sin, for without reaching an age for making genuine moral

decisions, their actions are born of a poisoned condition rather

than a conscious desire. They are therefore neither guilty of sin

nor under the penalty of eternal death. In short, their fallen state

and need for salvation is understood in an attenuated way, which

means that the need for divine redemption (and for baptism) is

likewise conceived in an attenuated manner.

“Somehow” Saved?

Erickson, as we saw above, argues that all persons who fail to

attain an age of moral competence are exempted from the guilt

and consequent condemnation of original sin. Erickson speaks of

children who die in infancy as participating in Adam’s sin, yet

they “somehow” are accepted and saved. What is peculiar about

this assertion is that while Erickson maintains that infants

participate in Adam’s sin and therefore need salvation, he also

argues that this participation is negated inasmuch as they have

not consciously endorsed Adam’s sin. Guilt may be reckoned to

infants only on condition they reach an age of responsibility and

consciously sin themselves. In fact, Erickson emphatically steers

away from the idea that children, so long as they are in their

morally immature state, are to be regarded as sinful, condemned,

and lost.

We may ask, following Erickson, what it actually means to

participate in Adam’s sin and need salvation. To answer that

query exposes Erickson’s position as incoherent. For if children

are not sinful, why do they need to be redeemed? If they are not

lost, why do they need to be found? And if they are not

condemned, why do they need to be justified? In light of what

Erickson has written, it appears that infants do not in fact need

redemption and justification. But what then does salvation mean

in this framework? The incoherence of Erickson’s formulation is

borne out by his use of the word “somehow.” Infants are

“somehow” saved. The reason he uses such a word in referring

to the salvation of infants is that they cannot exercise faith and

ORIGINAL SIN, INFANT SALVATION, AND THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS • 67

repentance and consequently cannot appropriate Christ. Erickson

is emphatic: without a conscious and willful act of sin on the part

of those who have become morally mature, guilt may not be

imputed to individuals even if they have inherited corruption

through Adam’s fall. Similarly, without a conscious act of faith on

the part of believers, Christ’s righteousness may not be imputed

to them. This means in the case of children who die in infancy

that salvation has become a “somehow,” for nobody is

automatically condemned or automatically saved.

Meanwhile, there is no such thing as “unconscious sin,” just

as there is no such thing as “unconscious faith”—which means,

following Erickson’s scheme, children are not yet sinners in need of

salvation. Instead, children are victims, subject to inherited

corruption, needing rescue from that condition. According to

Erickson, God in fact provides such rescue by way of

regeneration, bringing deceased infants to perfection when he

ushers them into glory. This takes place after the same manner

that believers obtain perfection upon entering eternal glory. But

we should observe that this is not salvation in the full New

Testament sense of the term, involving expiation, propitiation,

and remission of guilt. Rather, we may liken the salvation of

children who die in infancy as analogous to the renewal of the

created order itself. Just as the creation was subjected to

frustration through Adam’s fall, infants and children likewise find

themselves in the misery of this predicament. Similarly, as the

created order awaits liberation from its bondage, groaning in the

pains of childbirth, so those who are subjected to corruption

through no fault of their own await deliverance in the way of

regeneration and renewal (cf. Rom. 8:19-22). This in effect gives

us an amended and significantly diluted notion of “sin” and of

“sinner,” at least in the case of infants, and implicitly produces

sinners of diverse sorts and salvation of different kinds.

Two Types of Sinners, Two Types of Salvation

Lewis and Demarest travel with Erickson along this

trajectory. They speak of infants as involved in the universal

curse of Adam’s sin. After all, infants are subject to the curse of

68 • MID-AMERICA JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

sin, which is death, and to any number of other miseries. Yet they

are exempted from “the eternal penalty,” for they are not capable

of the transgressions which would eternally alienate them from

God. They are free from “imputed condemnation.” Similarly,

since infants are incapable of faith and repentance, the saving

benefits of Christ’s redemptive work come to them by way of

“special application.” This is not salvation from sins as such, that

is, from sins for which they must repent, for they have not

responsibly committed any sins. This is not salvation from guilt

and condemnation. Rather, this is salvation from corruption. In

other words, all children who die before coming to an age of

moral responsibility are pardoned of their sinful nature. Meanwhile,

children as such cannot be under the curse of eternal death, for

they have not yet transitioned to a state of personal guilt. They

are not yet actual sinners in need of a full-orbed salvation.

Nonetheless, Lewis and Demarest wish to maintain that children

who die before reaching moral responsibility are “saved” by way

of a special application of redemption. It is a special application

since children are incapable of faith and repentance. Thus

children need a special kind of salvation.

But here a problem is manifest. In waging their polemics

against the doctrine of original guilt, Lewis and Demarest, despite

their assertions to the contrary, speak of sin and salvation in an

equivocal manner and implicitly posit two types of sinners and

therefore two types of salvation. Sinners of the first sort are those

who stand guilty before God, having committed personal and

willful sin. They are subject to sin’s penalty for their own sins,

which involves physical and spiritual death as the divine curse

upon sin. As “guilty” sinners they need the remedy of Christ’s

expiatory sacrifice—that is, they need Christ’s vicarious sacrifice

on the cross as the remedy for the liability that accrues to them

because of their individual sins. As their Substitute, Christ bears

their guilt and pays the penalty that is upon the guilty.⁵⁰However,

following the theological construct of these authors, they

⁵⁰Lewis and Demarest, Integrative Theology, II:401-408; Erickson, Christian

Theology, 2^nded., 828-840; Grenz, Theology for the Community of God, 345-353;

Grudem, Systematic Theology, 570-81.

ORIGINAL SIN, INFANT SALVATION, AND THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS • 69

implicitly put forward another and second class of sinner. Sinners

of this second sort stand before God without guilt. Although they

are subject to the corruption or depravity of original sin, until

they reach an age of moral accountability they do not sin willfully

or knowingly and therefore are not guilty of sin even if their

behavior is not strictly in conformity to the law in all respects.

Because of their inherited corruption, they are born with the

inclination to sin—a wicked propensity that will inevitably

manifest itself upon reaching moral maturity. Thus, even in the

state of infancy such individuals stand in need of deliverance

from their corrupt condition. But they do not need salvation

understood as rescue from divine wrath or as the expiation of

guilt. This class of sinner is guilty neither of Adam’s sin nor of

personal sin.

A gross inconsistency is evident in this position. While

advocates for believer’s baptism maintain that faith is the

necessary prerequisite of salvation and argue vigorously against

the permissibility of infant baptism since infants cannot exercise

or evidence faith, nonetheless they reckon all infants in a state of

“salvation”—that is, salvation of the second type, for they are not

yet condemnable. This is salvation apart from faith. Those who die

before reaching a state of accountability are, apart from faith,

brought to the same state of eternal bliss that is promised to

those who are saved from eternal condemnation as sinners guilty

before God. These advocates of believer’s baptism, in positing a

doctrine of infant salvation, put forward a doctrine of salvation

that is apart from belief.

But who is the agent of this salvation? Why need Christ be

this agent? Or another why of asking these questions: How is

Christ’s sacrifice relevant to this kind of salvation?

Diverse Grounds of Salvation?

Questions of this sort are sharpened when we focus upon the

ground of salvation. Grenz asserts that God regenerates those

whom he knows will die in infancy. Apparently Grenz wishes to

distinguish regenerate infants from unregenerate infants—the

former God regenerates because he foreknows that they will die

70 • MID-AMERICA JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

in infancy, the latter God leaves in an unregenerate state because

he foreknows that they will reach moral maturity and transition

to a stage of personal moral guilt. This however does not address

what “status” infants have before God prior to death or prior to

transitioning to a state of condemnation.⁵¹

According to Grenz, in regenerating dying infants God

performs a work of special divine compassion and care. While

this work may exhibit special divine compassion and care, it is

not a work born out of Christ’s sacrificial death on the cross.

Grenz, in line with Erickson as well as Lewis and Demarest,

argues that persons are not condemned for a fallen nature but for

their own sinful actions. Only those who have committed wrong

moral choices stand under condemnation, which means all others

are free from this verdict. If infants are free from eternal

condemnation, then the divine rescue that comes to them is not

gracious, though it is compassionate. But even this compassion

seems to arise from obligation. God must regenerate those whom

he knows will die in infancy, otherwise he would unjustly punish

those who are not guilty and consequently not worthy of (eternal)

⁵¹This is a recurring and problematic feature of the scheme these authors

present. What is the status of infants prior to death? Are we to regard all

infants as “saved” until they transition (through personal sin) to guilt and

condemnation? If so, it appears that death has become a superior remedy for

the human condition than the cross. In fact, death becomes an instrument of

salvation and curse becomes a blessing. In short, for infants, salvation

becomes salvation “by death alone.” However, if we do not regard all infants

as “saved,” another option would be to regard all infants as “damned”—in

which case, only death brings the verdict of salvation. Indeed, Lewis and

Demarest suggest that infant death is indicative of divine election. But it is

askew and even mistaken to regard infants as “damned” following the

paradigm of these authors. For until infants mature and commit personal sin,

they are without guilt before God and under no condemnation. Neither of

these options looks very promising. A third option would require us to

consider infants as neither saved nor damned, but floating in a kind of

(Protestant style) limbus infantum, being neither in Adam (and condemned) nor

in Christ (and saved). But such a notion is wildly speculative and has no more

biblical support than the Roman Catholic version of limbus infantum whereby

infants are damned in being denied a vision of God but delivered from

physical torment. Rome, however, no longer officially holds to this view, see

Catechism of the Catholic Church, art. 1261.

ORIGINAL SIN, INFANT SALVATION, AND THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS • 71

condemnation. In this way, if God is to remain just and righteous

in all his actions, his regenerating dying infants has become an act

of necessity. But if this is so, the word salvation has been

stretched to the breaking point. For salvation is a grace-word. If

God must regenerate infants whom he knows will die before

reaching moral maturity, then the “salvation” these children

experience is no longer of grace.

Lewis and Demarest manifest this problem in a slightly

different way. They speak of a salvation that, by way of

exception, does not require faith and repentance. According to

their scheme, the exception applies not because there are

different grounds of salvation—one for infants who die, and

another for adults—but because infants are incapable of

committing sin and of exercising faith. The ground of salvation

remains the same for all persons. But this claim cannot bear up

when scrutinized. The grounds of salvation must be diverse since

the reasons for needing salvation are diverse. To be sure, Lewis

and Demarest may legitimately argue that the agent of salvation

remains the same. But clearly the need for salvation is different in

the case of morally guilty adults over against morally guiltless

children, which makes the ground or basis of salvation different.

For in the case of adults, Christ’s saving work must answer the

problem of personal guilt, whereas in the case of infants his work

of salvation need not address that problem—no such guilt exists.

Lewis and Demarest argue that infants need “pardon” for their

sinful natures. Pardon is a word that assumes the idea of guilt and

involves forgiveness. But, given the scheme Lewis and Demarest

set up, how are infants guilty for their fallen nature since they did

not consciously choose to inherit that nature? If sin and guilt

require conscious choice, as Lewis and Demarest maintain (along

with Erickson and Grenz), then children do not need to be

pardoned for possessing such a nature. Rather, at most, they need

to be rescued from the entanglements of that nature. But if that

is true, the ground of salvation shifts from sacrifice for guilt to a

restorative act by divine fiat. Upon death, God delivers infants

from their corrupt condition by a re-creative act of regeneration.

This act, however, is not (as noted above) grounded in grace, in

72 • MID-AMERICA JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

undeserved favor, for infants who die are not guilty of sin and

therefore they are not worthy of condemnation. On the contrary,

this act is incumbent upon God inasmuch as he would be unjust

to condemn those who are not guilty of sin. Thus Lewis and

Demarest (like Grenz) give us a notion of salvation that, as it

applies to dying infants, entails a necessary divine act of

restoration. But why would the cross be an ingredient in this

recipe of salvation? Atonement hardly seems necessary. Despite

what these authors assert to the contrary, the ground of salvation

is indeed different in the case of infants than in the case of adults.

The difference is nothing less than deliverance from guilt and

divine wrath.

The Injustice of Guiltless Suffering

A further inconsistency is evident as well, for it is not clear

why infants should come under any condemnation at all, eternal or

temporal. In other words, if inherited guilt is denied, why is

temporal condemnation merited while eternal condemnation is

not? What sins have infants committed? Indeed, what guilt bears

upon them? If they are not worthy of condemnation, how are

they subjects of salvation?

These opponents of infant baptism, in advocating a doctrine

of universal infant salvation, find themselves arguing for a

position that is hopelessly inconsistent. For they contend that

God would be unjust to punish eternally those who have not

committed personal sin. Yet they maintain that these same guiltless

individuals may suffer sin’s temporal penalties. Infants and young

children then are created to suffer the curse of death for no sin of

their own—a curse that includes agonizing disease, lingering

illness, debilitating injury, emotional and physical abuse, and the

ravages of famine, plague, and pestilence. This is a self-

contradictory stance. If infants and children are not worthy of

punishment, why should they suffer any temporal penalties? If

they are not guilty in and with Adam, so that Adam’s sin has not

been imputed to them, then even the temporal retributions they

endure are unfair and impermissible.

ORIGINAL SIN, INFANT SALVATION, AND THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS • 73

This problem is further exhibited in the nature of death itself,

for death is the key ingredient of curse. If infants and children are

unworthy of suffering eternal death, not needing rescue from

divine wrath, how are they, being guiltless, under the curse of

death—even temporal death?

According to these evangelical-Baptist proponents of infant

salvation, while baptizing covenant children is regarded as

presumptuous and harmful, all children are declared guiltless

before God—a privileged status Lewis and Demarest seem to

extend to youth up to twenty years of age. They further declare

all children free from a state of condemnation until each child

individually transitions to a condemned status through personal

sin. Nonetheless, as just noted, prior to committing personal sin,

these children are subject to sin’s curse. Thus advocates of

believer’s baptism allow guiltless infants to suffer all the maladies

of original sin with one exception—if they die in their guiltless

state, God is obliged to deliver them from eternal death. It is

hard to see how this paradigm protects the justice of God.

To be sure, in denying inherited guilt, or the imputation of

Adam’s first sin to infants, it is precisely the justice of God that

these authors wish to safeguard. But the paradigm they present to

replace the various Reformed constructions of original sin is, as

has become evident, permeated with numerous problems and

inconsistencies, including the problem of innocent suffering. For,

if children are without personal sin and guilt, then they have not

merited the suffering they are made to endure. This is nothing

other than unjust suffering.

It is evident that these Baptist authors have not established a

just and necessary connection between the miserable state of

children and the guiltless status children have before God, for

Grenz and Erickson suggest that children who have not

committed personal sin are not properly speaking sinners.

Advocates of the Augustinian doctrine of original sin or the

federalist scheme on the other hand, in viewing children as

participants in Adam’s sin, corrupted and guilty, have a much

better explanation for the suffering and death of infants, not to

mention a much better explanation as to how the sacrifice of

74 • MID-AMERICA JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

Christ’s full redemptive work applies to those whom God has

declared recipients of his promised salvation in Christ. In fact,

because a certain class of infants falls within the scope of this

promised salvation, these infants also qualify for the sign and seal

of that promise, that is, the sacrament of baptism.

Final Observations

In the foregoing we have seen that certain Baptist writers

reject the doctrine of infant baptism, in part, by positing a

doctrine of original sin that frees infants and children from

Adam’s guilt. In this way, infants and children do not stand in

need of the full redemptive accomplishment of Christ’s sacrifice

on the cross. In fact, it is not evident that such individuals need

the cross at all. Although they do need restoration, they do not

need Christ’s expiatory and propitiatory sacrifice inasmuch as

personal guilt may not be reckoned to them. Given this model,

infants and children are not the proper objects of salvation in the

full biblical sense of the term and therefore they are not the

proper subjects of the sign of baptism.

We have seen that this model or paradigm is not without

serious problems, for not only is the idea of salvation treated in

an equivocal manner—the ground of salvation being different for

children than for adults—but the instrumentality of faith likewise

acquires a different role in these diverse schemes of salvation,

being necessary for adults but unnecessary for children. This is a

peculiar stance to take given the sharp polemic Baptist

theologians wage against infant baptism and the inability of

infants to exercise faith. Only by positing two types of sinners

and therefore two types of salvation—even if this is posited only

implicitly—are these writers able to make sense of their paradigm

as an alternative to the Augustinian or federalist models.

We have also seen that the problem of guiltless suffering

emerges as a prominent and perplexing problem in this model.

God’s justice is not protected by arguing for universal infant

salvation. On the contrary, insofar as infants are subject to the

ORIGINAL SIN, INFANT SALVATION, AND THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS • 75

universality of the curse, including death itself, their suffering is

unjust if they are reckoned as guiltless.

Although Baptist theologians have alleged that the doctrine

of infant baptism was a practice in search of a theology, it seems

instead that contemporary advocates of believer’s baptism have

been in search of a diluted doctrine of original sin for children.

By allowing infants and children to escape the guilt of Adam’s

sin, the morally immature stand guiltless before God and come to

“salvation” apart from faith. Meanwhile, since faith figures so

prominently in the Baptist conception of baptism, only believers

may be baptized as a testimony to their rebirth and faith in

Christ. Indeed, why baptize persons unless they have faith in

Christ? In this way the salvation of infants is affirmed while the

sign of salvation (baptism) is administered only to those who

exercise faith. This brings forth the inevitable question: How are

children who die at a young age, before coming to faith, saved

apart from faith? According to Erickson and Grenz, along with

Lewis and Demarest, since infants and children are without

personal guilt, they do not need “faith” in Christ. They simply

need to be ushered to glory and made new. Thus, proponents of

universal infant salvation have yielded the principle that salvation

belongs only to those who embrace Christ by faith. We should

note however that if salvation is no longer strictly administered to

those who can exercise responsible faith, then it seems quite

unreasonable to withhold the symbol of salvation from those

who enjoy this status. But such is the scheme these authors

present in opposition to the Reformed model.

Naturally, the Reformed model of original sin, with its

vigorous doctrine of imputed guilt, paints a different portrait of

infant sinners. According to the Reformed model, infants and

children are sinners from birth, sinful from conception, and

therefore under the judgment of God. Consequently, they stand

in need of redemption as fully as adults do, for they are estranged

from God and at enmity with him. They are corrupt and guilty,

sinfully warped and accountable for their sin-and-sinfulness in

Adam. Thus, so long as Adam is their head and they remain

outside of Christ, they are under the curse of eternal

76 • MID-AMERICA JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

condemnation and death. They cannot enter the kingdom of God

unless they are born again. Infant sinners need cleansing and

forgiveness, which means they need Christ’s atoning sacrifice for

the remission of their sins. They also need the indwelling of the

Holy Spirit, for their lives will not proceed along the path of

repentance and faith in Christ except through rebirth. This

means, then, that if any class of children are recipients of the

divine promise of salvation, such that they are savable and in fact

saved only by the saving operation of Christ and his Spirit, then

they are likewise the proper subjects of the sign and seal of that

salvation, baptism.

Contrary to the assertions of these Baptist theologians,

infants and children find themselves under the curse of sin as

Adam’s children—the curse of eternal death! Indeed, Scripture

reveals that they are under the penalty of sin. If this were not so,

they would be exempted from the condition of sin itself. What is

more, if all children alike were free from sin’s curse, particularly

the guilt of sin, then it would be inappropriate for God to

distinguish the children of believers from the children of

unbelievers and to grant a privileged status to the former and not

the latter. Yet Scripture shows us that God consistently does this

very thing.

. During the flood, Noah and his children are spared the

punishment of the universal deluge, whereas unbelievers and

their children come under the divine judgment. The children

of unbelief, with their parents, perish (Gen. 7:21-23).

. Circumcision, a mark applied to believers and to their male-

infant offspring, carried the import of inclusion in the

covenant community of God’s gracious favor and blessing, as

well as the need for cleansing and the actual removal of

defilement (Exod. 6:12; Lev. 19:23; 26:41; Deut. 10:16; 30:6;

Jer. 4:4; 6:10; 9:25). This mark clearly distinguished children

who were the objects of God’s favor and kindness from

children who were under the sentence of death.

ORIGINAL SIN, INFANT SALVATION, AND THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS • 77

. The curse upon the firstborn of Egypt included infants (cf.

Exod. 11:4-7; 12:12, 29-30). The firstborn of Israel, however,

were unharmed by the judgment of death, sharing with their

parents the mark of the blood of the lamb (cf. Exod. 12:13).

. During the period of the conquest, those under the sacral ban

(cherem)—that is, those under the penalty of God’s righteous

judgment and devoted to complete annihilation—included

the children of unbelievers (Num. 21:21-35; Deut. 2:34; 3:6;

7:2; 20:16, 17; Josh. 6:21; 7:24-25; 8:24). They were not

spared. Thus we see that a principle of inclusion applies: the

children of unbelievers are included in the divine curse;

however, the children of believers are included in the divine

blessing.

. The children of believers are regarded as holy—even when

there is only one believing parent (1 Cor. 7:14). Such an

affirmation is irrelevant—even inappropriate—if all children

share the same status of guiltlessness before God. Indeed,

how are the children of believers holy if all children alike are

free from personal guilt and condemnation? What is more, if

God is obliged to save all children who die in infancy, then

what distinguishes one infant from another is not the faith or

unbelief of the parents, and not whether an infant

participates in the divine promise of salvation, but whether

death comes upon a child prior to reaching the age of

accountability. The divine promise of Acts 2:39 is rendered

null and void in this scheme. The salvation of children, being

a salvation apart from faith, is dependent upon death.

Holiness, then, is determined by death, not by the covenant-

promise of God.

The Reformed conception of original sin likewise offers a

superior answer to the question regarding the status of infants

prior to death. In fact, the Reformed answer to this question has

direct bearing on the question of infant baptism.

As noted earlier, since all children are both corrupt and guilty

in Adam, they need divine redemption fully as much as adults do.

78 • MID-AMERICA JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY

This means that all persons find themselves either in Adam (and

condemned) or in Christ (and saved). There is no status

independent of these two heads of humanity—it is either Adam

or Christ. The question, then, is under whose headship children

come. Are they in Adam or in Christ?

The authors we examined above cannot give an unequivocal

answer to this question. Clearly, each of them wishes to say that

all persons are in Adam with respect to the corruption of sin. But

corruption does not automatically render a person guilty and

condemnable. Thus infants, should they die before reaching an

age of moral accountability, find themselves candidates of a kind

of requisite divine mercy to rescue them from their inherited

corruption. Meanwhile, if their inherited corruption is left

unchecked and allowed to progress, it will bear its inevitable

fruits and come to ratify Adam’s sin, whereby guilt is incurred

and there is a transition from guiltlessness to a state of guilt.

Infants as such, however, are not worthy of damnation since they

are not culpable for any sin.

But, as already observed, according to the scheme set forth

by these authors infants appear to be neither in Adam nor in

Christ. And this again illustrates what is implicit in their position:

there are two kinds of sinners and therefore two kinds of

salvation. Similarly, given their attenuated doctrine of original sin,

along with their equivocal statements regarding the status of

infants before God, it is easy to see why children fail to qualify as

candidates for baptism. Yet, ironically, they do qualify as

candidates for a thinned down variety of “salvation”—a salvation

that is apart from expiation and propitiation. Following the path

of these authors, it is not clear that Christ is responsible for the

salvation of infants. In fact, the cross seems superfluous.

The Reformed position recognizes that all persons are

polluted and guilty in Adam, subject to eternal condemnation,

and needful of the divine rescue that only Christ can give. Only

those who are the recipients of the divine promise of salvation in

Christ find deliverance from their sinful state and the remission

of their sins.

ORIGINAL SIN, INFANT SALVATION, AND THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS • 79

Insofar as any child (or for that matter, any person) is in

possession of the reality and substance of salvation—that is,

Christ himself—it is inappropriate to withhold salvation’s sign

and seal from him. We must remember that that which is

signified by the sign is always greater than the sign itself. Christ

and the salvation he bestows are greater than the sign of baptism

which depicts and portrays salvation. Similarly, the forgiveness of

sins and being made alive in Christ are greater than the rite

announcing and promising those blessings. Since the children of

believers are counted as those to whom the promise of salvation

is directed and for whom it applies, it is altogether fitting and

necessary that these children receive the sign and seal that

testifies to their status in Christ as children of promise. In short, in

possessing Christ, they must be baptized.

We see then that given the Reformed understanding of

baptism’s import and the inclusive nature of the divine promise

of salvation, embracing believers and their seed, the mark of that

salvation—baptism—is rightly and necessarily administered to

them. For it is beyond dispute that the gracious blessings of

salvation are extended to them: the washing away of sin, the

remission of guilt, rebirth, and new life in Christ. This new life in

Christ—salvation—stands in stark contrast to the former life in

Adam. To deny the sign of baptism to those who are identified

with Christ undermines the divine intention in ordaining the sign.

Our examination of contemporary Baptist authors has

demonstrated that the polemic against infant baptism involves

more than issues of baptism’s import and mode. In back of these

issues is the question of original guilt and its consequences. We

have shown that those who are guilty in Adam need the remedy

that comes only in the second Adam, Christ the Lord, the remedy

that saves infants as well. Indeed, those who are united with

Christ, according to divine promise, are the objects of God’s

saving mercy and so likewise the proper subjects of baptism—

believers and their children.

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