'원죄와 용서 그리고 유아세례'에 대한 어거스틴의 관점
하나님과 이웃과 개혁신학을 사랑합니다.

하나님은 사랑이시라 사랑 안에 거하는 자는 하나님 안에 거하고 하나님도 그의 안에 거하시느니라(요일 4:16)

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신학 자료/조직신학

'원죄와 용서 그리고 유아세례'에 대한 어거스틴의 관점

개혁신학어벤져스 2023. 3. 5. 23:49

'원죄 교리'는 초대교회 어거스틴 이래로 정립되었습니다.

 핵심적으로 원죄 교리를 '초대교회 송영신학의 아름다운 결과물'로 이해하는 것이 현대인들에게 원죄교리를 오해하지 않는 '유일한 길'입니다.

*관련하여, 모든 논의의 중심에 있는 어거스틴의 'De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo pavulorum'(죄벌과 용서 그리고 유아세례)을 업로드합니다. 직접, 어떤 의도로 원죄교리가 생성되었는지 파악하시길 바랍니다. 필립 샤프의 번역을 올립니다.

 -> 라틴어 원문도 찾아보시길 바랍니다!


* De Peccatorum Meritis Et Remissione Et De Baptismo Parvulorum

A Treatise On The Merits And Forgiveness Of Sins, And On The Baptism Of Infants - Philip Schaff

0354-0430,_Augustinus,_De_Peccatorum_Meritis_Et_Remissione_Et_De_Baptismo_Parvulorum_[Schaff],_EN.pdf
4.08MB

 


 -> 관련하여, 원죄교리에 대해 개혁신학적 관점으로 접근하는 교수님들의 대화를 들어보시길 바랍니다!

2020.07.21 - [신학 자료/조직신학] - 원죄는 진짜 있나요?

 

원죄는 진짜 있나요?

원죄교리는 초대교회 어거스틴 이래로 정립되었습니다. 관련하여, 개혁신학은 원죄를 실제적으로 인정하며, 믿음으로 수납합니다. 또한, 개혁신학은 이를 현상학적인 관찰을 통한 결과물로 이

cr-ministry-institute.tistory.com


 * 이어, 원죄와 유아세례에 대한 어거스틴의 관점(펠라기우스주의자에 대한 반론으로 이해해야 함)을 객관적으로 분석한 논문을 첨부합니다. 개혁교회에서 '왜 유아세례를 허용하는지?'에 대해 이해하도록 돕습니다. 

 * ORIGINAL SIN, INFANT SALVATION, AND THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS - J. Mark Beach

 

MJT 12 (2001) 47-79  
ORIGINAL SIN, INFANT SALVATION, AND  
THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS  
—A Critique of Some Contemporary Baptist Authors—  
by J. Mark Beach  
Introduction  
IN REFORMED THINKING the covenant of grace forms the basis  
for the practice of infant baptism. This practice, however, has  
been much contested within Protestant theology, causing the  
mercury on the theological thermometer to rise from time to  
time. Heated polemics, of course, are not foreign to the topic of  
infant baptism. Countless articles, treatises, books, and pamphlets  
have been written in favor of and in opposition to the baptism of  
infants. Certainly theologians and scholars have not lacked  
resolve and conviction regarding this subject; nonetheless, no  
unanimity has resulted as a consequence of nearly half a  
millennium of polemics. Proponents from each side of the  
debate have been unable to achieve a consensus among  
Protestants regarding the proper subjects of baptism. The issue  
remains a cause for division.  
Thus, after nearly five hundred years of debate, some  
theologians are pleading for a truce within the evangelical church.  
Wayne Grudem, for example, while himself arguing vigorously  
for believer’s baptism, does not think baptism ought to be a  
point of division among churches. He suggests that paedobaptists  
and advocates of believer’s baptism jointly acknowledge that  
“baptism is not a major doctrine of the faith.” Grudem  
recognizes that this would require concessions on the part of  
48 • MID-AMERICA JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY  
Baptists and paedobaptists alike so that both views of baptism  
could be “taught and practiced” in their respective churches. 1  
Grudem’s suggestion comes, as noted above, after he has  
waged his own polemic against infant baptism. While his desire  
to see greater unity in the evangelical church is highly  
commendable, especially since evangelicals hold so much in  
common confessionally, Grudem’s plea for accommodating (or  
tolerating) one another’s theology and practice reflects a doctrine  
of baptism that must be challenged. In other words, in  
advocating that Baptist and paedobaptist churches agree to  
disagree regarding the theology and practice of infant baptism,  
and even agree to permit one another’s theology and practice of  
baptism within the same ecclesiastical circle, Grudem shows that  
he is ready to underrate baptism’s place and importance.  
Consequently, while Grudem’s plea is attractive, it fundamentally  
misunderstands the doctrine of infant baptism that was given  
confessional shape among the Reformed during the Protestant  
Reformation. What is more, other recent Baptist theologians  
have sounded a different note regarding the permissibility of  
infant baptism and the necessity of believer’s baptism.  
Stanley J. Grenz, in offering what we might call a distillation  
of the Baptist assessment of infant baptism, notes that  
proponents of believer’s baptism “reject infant baptism as an  
inferior, even dangerous, practice.” Since infants lack personal  
conscious faith, the rite either comes to a meaningless “baby  
dedication” or “is inflated to a regenerative act which encourages  
confidence in baptism rather than in Christ.” Moreover, infant  
baptism is deemed to be “harmful,” for it does not allow the  
child to make use of “the divinely ordained means of declaring  
conscious and responsible belief in Jesus Christ later in life.” The  
“dangerous” character of infant baptism is also evident in the  
phenomenon of “a national church which extends the boundaries  
of the faith community to the political boundaries of the land.”2  
1Wayne Grudem, Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine  
(Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House; Leicester, England: Inter-  
Varsity Press, 1994), 982.  
2Stanley J. Grenz, Theology for the Community of God (1994; repr., Grand  
ORIGINAL SIN, INFANT SALVATION, AND THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS • 49  
Rhetoric of this sort, with words like “dangerous” and  
“harmful,” hardly represents a softening of the polemic or an  
openness to accommodate diverse perspectives pertaining to the  
baptism of infants. It is apparent that not all advocates of  
believer’s baptism are prepared to make their peace with the  
paedobaptist position. Likewise from the Reformed side,  
paedobaptists have not historically been of the conviction that  
the baptism of covenant children is optional. On the contrary,  
historic Reformed practice argued not merely for the  
permissibility of infant baptism but for its necessity. As G. C.  
Berkouwer notes, “the practice of infant baptism rests upon a  
definite confession.”3 This is reflected, for example, in the old  
Dutch Reformed “Form for the Baptism of Infants.” In this  
Form believing parents acknowledge that their children are sinful  
from conception and birth and are therefore subject to all  
manner of misery, even eternal condemnation; yet, as recipients  
of the divine promise of grace, they are “sanctified in Christ” and  
so as “members of His Church ought to be baptized.”4  
Since this is so, Baptists and paedobaptists are faced with the  
temptation simply to agree to disagree and go their separate ways.  
A better avenue seems open to us, however, and that is frankly to  
acknowledge how far apart advocates of believer’s baptism and  
infant baptism remain, while attempting to explore and clarify the  
debate.  
This leads us to inquire into the status of the debate. What  
precisely is the hinge upon which the disagreement pivots? Is  
there any possibility of narrowing the gap between these two  
positions in a manner other than Grudem’s proposal of mutual  
toleration?  
In an attempt to clarify and continue the discussion we do  
well to examine the shape of the current consensus against infant  
baptism among evangelical-Baptist theologians in North  
Rapids: Eerdmans, Vancouver: Regent College Publishing, 2000), 528-529.  
3G. C. Berkouwer, The Sacraments, trans. Hugo Beker (Grand Rapids:  
Eerdmans, 1969), 161.  
4Quote taken from appended pages of Psalter Hymnal (Grand Rapids: Board  
of Publications of the Christian Reformed Church, 1976), 125; italics added.  
50 • MID-AMERICA JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY  
America. More specifically, we do well to examine a facet of the  
debate that is often neglected, namely, the role that the doctrine  
of original sin plays in determining the status of infants and  
children—both the children of believers and unbelievers—which  
in turn has direct implications concerning the proper subjects of  
baptism. I maintain that the doctrine of original sin has  
significant implications for the assessment of infant baptism. In  
other words, the theological pre-commitment on the nature and  
scope of original sin and who therefore may be reckoned as  
participants in Adam’s sin plays an important role in how both  
opponents and proponents of infant baptism “size up” the  
Scriptural evidence for the practice of baptizing children. In  
short, the doctrine of infant baptism is intimately connected to  
the doctrine of original sin. The current evangelical-Baptist  
consensus in opposition to the traditional formulation of the  
doctrine of original sin significantly downplays the effects of  
original sin upon infants and all others who have not reached a  
state of moral accountability. What this means for the issue of  
infant baptism is that children, before reaching an age of moral  
accountability, are not reckoned in strict need of the redemption  
that baptism symbolizes.  
However, if either the classical, broadly Augustinian  
conception or the federalist scheme of original sin is valid, such  
that even infants are corrupted and guilty in Adam’s sin, then  
they too, even as infants, stand in need of Christ’s redemptive  
work as those who are guilty and condemnable in God’s eyes.  
Thus in opposition to the current Baptist consensus, the  
Reformed understanding of original sin maintains that infants are  
dirty and need to be washed in the blood of Christ—even as they  
are guilty and need to be justified by Christ’s perfect sacrifice and  
active obedience in fulfillment of the law. Consequently, insofar  
as a certain class of infants are indubitably the objects of divine  
redemption, the sign and seal of that redemption—baptism—  
ought to be administered to them. Of course, in this connection  
baptism’s import looms large on the horizon of debate.  
The argument of this essay will proceed in the following  
manner: First I shall present in outline the Baptist consensus  
ORIGINAL SIN, INFANT SALVATION, AND THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS • 51  
against the baptism of infants. Next I shall consider the rejection  
of the doctrine of original guilt that forms a part of that  
consensus—a rejection that paves the way for a doctrine of  
infant salvation. This discussion is followed by a brief analysis of  
how the denial of inherited guilt coincides with the rejection of  
infant baptism. Finally I shall offer an extensive critique of the  
evangelical-Baptist consensus on original sin and infant salvation,  
and its dismissal of infant baptism. In particular I shall argue that  
any doctrine of infant salvation which bypasses the necessity and  
fullness of Christ’s redemptive work is contrary to Scripture and  
must be rejected. I also argue that all humans—whether young or  
old, mentally handicapped or of sound mind—reach eternal  
blessedness only through Christ’s full redemptive work on the  
cross and the Spirit’s renewing operation. From that perspective,  
I also argue that the sign of salvation may not be separated from  
the thing signified, which is to say, if one participates in the  
reality of salvation he or she must receive the sign of that  
salvation—the mark of baptism.  
An Outline of the Evangelical-Baptist Consensus  
against the Baptism of Infants  
In considering the treatment of baptism among  
contemporary evangelical-Baptist authors, I will be examining the  
works of the following theologians: Millard J. Erikson’s Christian  
Theology,5 Gordon R. Lewis and Bruce A. Demarest’s Integrative  
Theology: Historical, Biblical, Systematic, Apologetic, Practical,6 and  
Stanley J. Grenz’s Theology for the Community of God.7 While  
5Millard J. Erickson, Christian Theology, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker Books,  
1998).  
6Gordon R. Lewis & Bruce A. Demarest, Integrative Theology: Historical,  
Biblical, Systematic, Apologetic, Practical. Three volumes in one (Grand Rapids:  
Zondervan Publishing House, 1996).  
7Stanley J. Grenz, Theology for the Community of God (1994; repr., Grand  
Rapids: Eerdmans., Vancouver: Regent College Publishing, 2000). Interest-  
ingly, in his Systematic Theology, Wayne Grudem, another contemporary  
evangelical-Baptist author, follows a more traditional Augustinian doctrine of  
original sin and therefore a trajectory distinct from these other writers; see his  
52 • MID-AMERICA JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY  
complete unanimity cannot be found among these writers on all  
issues pertaining to baptism, it is fair to say that together they  
represent a major consensus among proponents of believer’s  
baptism. What follows is a distillation of their arguments against  
infant baptism, gleaned from their own polemics as well as the  
sources they cite in defense of their position.8  
In summary form, the baptism of infants is impermissible for  
the following reasons: (1) Practitioners of infant baptism  
fundamentally misconceive and misconstrue the nature and import of  
baptism; consequently, in allowing infants to be baptized, the  
proponents of this custom misuse the ordinance that Christ  
ordained for the benefit of believers.9 (2) The New Testament witness  
is silent on the question of infant baptism, evident in that not a  
single instance of the practice can be adduced for its support,  
including the texts that describe household baptisms.10 (3) The  
key New Testament texts that paedobaptists cite in support of the  
baptism of infants simply are not applicable, including the often  
vague appeal to the covenant of grace and the continuity that  
allegedly exists between the Old and the New Testaments on the  
nature and place of children in the covenant community.11 (4)  
The sequence for the operation of salvation that prevails in the  
New Testament is contrary to the theology and practice of  
baptizing infants, for that sequence consists of gospel preaching,  
the hearing of gospel preaching, confession of faith, and then  
water baptism. Since infants are incapable of the requisite faith,  
their baptism is premature and inappropriate. The membership  
Systematic Theology, 494-501.  
8For part of this list I have adapted the synopsis of James Leo Garrett,  
Systematic Theology: Biblical, Historical, and Evangelical, 2 vols. (Grand Rapids:  
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1990, 1995), II:526-528.  
9See Grenz, Theology for the Community of God, 529; Lewis and Demarest,  
Integrative Theology, III:288; Erickson, Christian Theology, 2nd ed., 1105-1106; also  
Grudem, Systematic Theology, 978-79.  
10See Garrett, Systematic Theology, II:526; Grenz, Theology for the Community of  
God, 528; Lewis and Demarest, Integrative Theology, III:289; Erickson, Christian  
Theology, 2nd ed., 1111-1112; Grudem, Systematic Theology, 978.  
11See Garrett, Systematic Theology, II:527; Lewis and Demarest, Integrative  
Theology, III:288; Erickson, Christian Theology, 2nd ed., 1112; Grudem, Systematic  
Theology, 976-77.  
ORIGINAL SIN, INFANT SALVATION, AND THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS • 53  
of the church must respect this sequence, for only those are  
members of Christ and of his church who are united to him by  
credible faith.12 (5) The case for believer’s baptism does not depend  
upon mere occasions or instances of baptism recorded for us in  
the New Testament. Rather, it is determined by the wider and  
broader scope of the New Testament witness as such—that is, it  
rests upon “New Testament theology.” Thus Christ’s person and  
work, the church’s nature and function, as well as the  
eschatological significance of salvation in its entire scope must  
come into play as we consider the doctrine of baptism and see  
the support for believer’s baptism in opposition to infant  
baptism.13 (6) The practical consequences of infant baptism are often  
harmful, leading the recipients of infant baptism to presume that  
they are regenerate and do not need seriously to consider their  
spiritual state before God. Consequently, over time, the church is  
crippled by unbelief. Moreover, another practical consequence of  
the baptism of infants is that it easily links up with the idea of a  
national church (a Volkskirche) wherein the boundaries of the  
church are inclusive of all the citizenry of the state. The church is  
thus infected with nominal religion, since a large segment of the  
baptized population in such a circumstance tends not to worship  
God or live the new life in Christ which baptism, rightly  
conceived, symbolizes.14 (7) Infant baptism is inordinately and  
needlessly linked to a doctrine of original guilt. In the early  
centuries of the church the baptism of infants was a “practice in  
search of a theology,” with the consequence that a theology of  
original sin, which imputed the guilt of Adam’s first sin to infants  
so that they share in eternal damnation, needed a theology of  
12See Garrett, Systematic Theology, II:526-27; Grudem, Systematic Theology, 969-  
70; G. R. Beasley-Murray, Baptism in the New Testament. W. T. Whitley  
Lectureship, 1962, American Paperback Edition (1973; reprint edition, Grand  
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 272, 274.  
13See Garrett, Systematic Theology, II:528.  
14See Garrett, Systematic Theology, II:527; Grenz, Theology for the Community of  
God, 529; Lewis and Demarest, Integrative Theology, III:288-89; Grudem,  
Systematic Theology, 980.  
54 • MID-AMERICA JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY  
baptism that delivered infants from that guilt and its  
consequences.15  
This list of arguments constitutes quite a polemic against  
baptizing infants. Of course, numerous Reformed responses to  
such arguments are within easy reach.16 Our purpose here is not  
to engage each of these theses, except for the last and, in some  
respects, the most decisive one, the argument that infant baptism  
is inappropriately linked to the doctrine of original sin. This  
argument is particularly curious in view of the consensus that can  
be discerned among evangelical-Baptist writers regarding the  
doctrine of infant salvation, or more specifically, the doctrine that  
affirms the salvation of all persons who die in infancy or before  
reaching a state of accountability. We wish to subject this  
doctrine to analysis and critique, particularly as it forms part of  
the Baptist polemic against the baptism of infants.  
15See Garrett, Systematic Theology, II:527.  
16See B. B. Warfield’s response over a century ago to the arguments of  
Augustus Hopkins Strong, entitled “The Polemics of Infant Baptism,” The  
Works of Benjamin B. Warfield, vol. 9, Studies in Theology (1932; repr., Grand  
Rapids: Baker Books, 1991), 398-408. Warfield offers a cogent rebuttal to  
Strong, and many of his polemical arrows hit the target of the criticisms  
summarized above. Also see G. C. Berkouwer, The Sacraments, 161-187;  
Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, 3 vols. (1871-1873; repr., Grand Rapids:  
Eerdmans, 1981), III, 546-579; Robert Dabney, Lectures in Systematic Theology  
(1927; repr., Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1985), 777-799; Louis  
Berkhof, Systematic Theology (1939, 1941), 631-643; Wilhelmus à Brakel, The  
Christian’s Reasonable Service, 4 vols., trans. Bartel Elshout (Ligonier, PA: Soli  
Deo Gloria Publications, 1993), II:504-511; John Murray, Christian Baptism  
(Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1980), 45-82; H. Westerink, A Sign of Faithfulness:  
Covenant and Baptism, trans. J. Mark Beach (Neerlandia, Alberta; Pella, Iowa:  
Inheritance Publications, 1997); Pierre Ch. Marcel, The Biblical Doctrine of Infant  
Baptism, trans. P. E. Hughes (London: James Clarke & Co., 1953), 187-245;  
John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 2 vols., ed. John T. McNeill, trans.  
Ford Lewis Battles (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1960), IV.16.1-32.  
ORIGINAL SIN, INFANT SALVATION, AND THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS • 55  
The Evangelical-Baptist Consensus Regarding  
Original Sin and Infant Salvation  
In setting forth his doctrine of original sin, Millard Erickson  
begins by arguing for a realist conception or what he terms the  
“natural headship of Adam.” Humans participate in Adam’s sin  
by being “actually present within Adam.” This means that “we all  
sinned in his act.” Erickson believes this scheme solves the  
problem of alien guilt and answers the charge of injustice, for we  
sin with Adam.17  
Yet a problem remains. What is the condition of infants and  
children? If his realist conception of original sin is correct, this  
implies that all persons—including infants and children—are  
born with a corrupted nature and reckoned guilty in being sinners  
with Adam. This brings Erickson to consider whether children  
who die in infancy, before they make a conscious decision of  
faith, are lost and condemned to eternal death. At this point his  
doctrine of original sin softens: “While the status of infants and  
those who never reach moral competence is a difficult question,  
it appears that our Lord did not regard them as under  
condemnation.” This means that all those who fail to attain an  
age of moral competence are exempted from the guilt and  
consequent condemnation that is part of original sin. In fact,  
Erickson argues that Jesus held little children up as an example of  
the type of person who will inherit the kingdom of God (Matt.  
18:3; 19:14), meaning they are free from the guilt and eternal  
penalty of original sin. Erickson also appeals to 2 Samuel 12:23,  
wherein David expresses confidence that he would again see his  
child who had died. “On the basis of such considerations,” writes  
Erickson, “it is difficult to maintain that children are to be  
thought of as sinful, condemned, and lost.”18  
Erickson maintains that in taking this position he is not being  
“sentimental.” On the contrary, he believes this position is  
biblically required, for Scripture tells us that “persons are not  
morally responsible before a certain point, which we sometimes  
17Erickson, Christian Theology, 2nd ed., 654.  
18Erickson, Christian Theology, 2nd ed., 654.  
56 • MID-AMERICA JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY  
call ‘the age of accountability’.”19 Erickson offers the following  
arguments in support of this idea:  
In Deuteronomy 1:39, Moses says, ‘And the little ones that you  
said would be taken captive, your children who do not yet know  
good from bad—they will enter the land. I will give it to them  
and they will take possession of it.’ Even with the Hebrew idea  
of corporate personality and corporate responsibility, these  
children were not held responsible for the sins of Israel. In the  
messianic prophecy in Isaiah 7, there are two references to the  
time when the boy ‘knows enough to reject the wrong and  
choose the right’ (vv. 15, 16). Finally, Jonah quotes God as  
saying, ‘But Nineveh has more than a hundred and twenty  
thousand people who cannot tell their right hand from their left,  
and many cattle as well. Should I not be concerned about that  
great city?’ (4:11). Although this is less clear, it appears from the  
context that the reference is to the ability to distinguish morally.  
Underlying these statements is the apparent fact that prior to a  
certain point in life, there is no moral responsibility, because  
there is no awareness of right and wrong.20  
Erickson further argues that just as Christ’s righteousness is  
not imputed to believers without a conscious act of faith—  
otherwise all would automatically be saved—so the imputation of  
Adam’s guilt requires “some sort of volitional choice as well.” If  
“unconscious sin” is valid, then “unconscious faith” is valid.  
Both notions are dubious in Erickson’s mind.21 As for children  
who die in infancy or an early age, despite their participation in  
Adam’s sin, “they are somehow accepted and saved.” The  
“spiritual effects” of the original curse are canceled out in their  
case inasmuch as they have made no conscious choice of Adam’s  
sin. Referring to the parallelism between Adam and Christ in  
Romans 5, Erickson asserts that while some theological  
constructions preserve this parallelism “by allowing both  
unconscious or unconditional imputation of Adam’s guilt and  
19Erickson, Christian Theology, 2nd ed., 654.  
20Erickson, Christian Theology, 2nd ed., 654-655.  
21Erickson, Christian Theology, 2nd ed., 655.  
ORIGINAL SIN, INFANT SALVATION, AND THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS • 57  
Christ’s righteousness,” he believes an alternative construction is  
preferable.22  
The current form of my understanding is as follows: We all were  
involved in Adam’s sin, and thus receive both the corrupted  
nature that was his after the fall, and the guilt and condemnation  
that attach to his sin. With this matter of guilt, however, just as  
with the imputation of Christ’s righteousness, there must be  
some conscious and voluntary decision on our part. Until this is  
the case, there is only a conditional imputation of guilt. Thus,  
there is no condemnation until one reaches the age of  
responsibility. If a child dies before becoming capable of making  
genuine moral decisions, the contingent imputation of Adamic  
sin does not become actual, and the child will experience the  
same type of future existence with the Lord as will those who  
have reached the age of moral responsibility and had their sins  
forgiven as a result of accepting the offer of salvation based  
upon Christ’s atoning death. The problem of the corrupted  
nature of such persons is presumably dealt with in the way that  
the imperfectly sanctified nature of believers will be glorified.23  
For Erickson, then, our voluntary decision ends our childish  
innocence and constitutes a ratification of the first sin of the fall.  
Wishing however to avoid the Arminian view which postpones  
the imputation of the first sin until we commit a sin of our own,  
whereby we ratify Adam’s first sin so that it is imputed to us,  
Erickson aims to preserve the parallelism between our accepting  
the work of Christ and that of Adam, while simultaneously  
affirming our responsibility for the first sin. “We become  
responsible and guilty,” says Erickson, “when we accept or  
approve of our corrupt nature.” Upon recognition of “our own  
tendency toward sin,” we can either repent of it and seek divine  
forgiveness, or we can acquiesce in it and in effect embrace the  
sinful nature. “By placing our tacit approval upon the corruption,  
we are also approving or concurring in the action in the Garden  
of Eden so long ago.” This means that “we become guilty of that  
22Erickson, Christian Theology, 2nd ed., 655-656.  
23Erickson, Christian Theology, 2nd ed., 656.  
58 • MID-AMERICA JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY  
sin without having committed any sin of our own.”24 Thus guilt  
attaches itself to corruption along the path of personal sin.  
Retroactively, upon a personal and morally responsible act of  
transgression, original guilt is imputed to the sinner.  
In their joint work entitled Integrative Theology, Gordon R.  
Lewis and Bruce A. Demarest also address the topic of original  
sin and the baptism of infants. Lewis and Demarest, like  
Erickson, affirm original sin, with a doctrine of depravity, and the  
solidarity of guilt.25 They conceive of this solidarity in the way of  
“realism,” for humans are a single race and Adam’s natural  
headship is presupposed in the theological argument of Romans  
5.26 However, in defining the grounds of judgment, guilt, and  
punishment, Lewis and Demarest, again like Erickson, do not  
affirm a doctrine of imputed guilt but focus upon personal  
rebellion, for all are “accountable for breaking faith with the  
Creator.” “Before God himself we find ourselves repeatedly  
guilty of illicit desires, relationships, words, and acts.”27  
Having said this, Lewis and Demarest likewise (as an  
inevitability) raise the question regarding the moral and legal  
standing of children who die in infancy. They observe that  
children born of flesh are flesh (John 3:6; cf. Ps. 51:5; Eph. 2:3).  
Moreover, such children are included in the universal curse that  
God placed upon humanity in Adam (Rom. 5:16, 18) and  
consequently they physically die (v. 12). “Nevertheless infants  
who die do not suffer the eternal penalty, for that penalty falls only  
on those who themselves responsibly sin.28  
In defense of this position Lewis and Demarest argue that  
whereas the parents who sinned during the wilderness journey  
died without entering the Promised Land as a consequence of  
their sin, the children, not yet being morally responsible, did not  
24Erickson, Christian Theology, 2nd ed., 656.  
25Gordon R. Lewis & Bruce A. Demarest, Integrative Theology, II:208-222,  
especially pages 214-15, 218-19.  
26Lewis and Demarest, Integrative Theology, II:221-222.  
27Lewis and Demarest, Integrative Theology, II:221.  
28Lewis and Demarest, Integrative Theology, II:223.  
ORIGINAL SIN, INFANT SALVATION, AND THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS • 59  
undergo their parents’ penalty; instead, they entered the land of  
promise (Deut. 1:39).  
The age of responsibility here indicated was twenty years for  
inclusion in the census of adult citizens (Num. 14:29-31). Other  
passages show that children may suffer the natural consequences  
of their parents’ sin until the third and fourth generations (Exod.  
20:5; 34:7), but their spiritual relation to God, whether good or  
bad, was not determined by their parents. ‘The soul who sins is  
the one who will die’ (Ezek. 18:20). Children are not capable of  
responsibly committing the sins attributed to those who eternally  
alienate themselves from God. For reasons like these, minors  
who die before reaching moral accountability, will not suffer the  
execution of the penalty of imputed condemnation.29  
Since infants are incapable of repentance and faith, they  
cannot take hold of the benefits of Christ’s atoning work except  
by way of “special application.” Lewis and Demarest argue that  
this does not constitute a “different ground of salvation,” though  
it does entail a “different mode of application.” They accent the  
fact that in Scripture punishment is always according to merit and  
befits the crime. Children who die in infancy therefore do not  
suffer eternal punishment for their parents’ sins. “The eternal  
welfare of each soul is determined by itself irregardless [sic] of  
whether the parents were wicked or good (Ezek. 18).” What this  
comes to in Lewis and Demarest’s analysis is that, though infants  
are “under the sentence of eternal death” inasmuch as they share  
solidarity with the human race, they will not suffer eternally since  
they “have not themselves responsibly sinned.”30  
Lewis and Demarest also appeal to Matthew 18:2-14 and  
19:14.  
[A]lthough these passages are not as explicit as we might like,  
they may justify a special application of the provisions of Christ’s  
atonement to children. Since they have not responsibly  
committed any sins and have no sins of which to repent, and  
since they could not consciously believe on Christ to deliver  
29Lewis and Demarest, Integrative Theology, II:223.  
30Lewis and Demarest, Integrative Theology, II:223.  
60 • MID-AMERICA JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY  
them from their innate inclination to sin, surely Christ will  
pardon them of their sinful natures and welcome them to his  
kingdom, whether or not the parents are in the covenant,  
whether or not they have had the child undergo infant baptism  
or last rites.31  
Children who die in infancy, indeed all those who fail to attain a  
state of moral accountability, stand justified and are forgiven their  
inherited inclination to commit sin. Infant death therefore is  
indicative of divine election.32  
Stanley Grenz is another author whose doctrine of original  
sin does not fit within classically Reformed theological categories.  
In considering what he calls “the Reformed view” of original sin,  
a doctrine that entails the idea that all Adam’s offspring inherit  
both a depraved nature and actual guilt, Grenz challenges the  
Reformed exegesis of Ephesians 2:3 and Romans 5:12-21. Grenz  
argues that the phrase in Ephesians 2:3 “by nature children of  
wrath” is better translated “by nature wrathful children,” so that  
what the apostle teaches in this verse is not that Adam’s offspring  
are guilty with Adam’s sin but all humans are by nature “wrathful  
people.”33 Grenz also challenges the Reformed understanding of  
Romans 5:12-21. Inasmuch as Paul affirms “the universality of  
sin” through Adam’s disobedience and “the divine solution”  
through the obedience of Christ, making “righteousness  
available,” the apostle’s point is that “Adam and Christ are  
similar because the results of their actions affect us.” However,  
according to Grenz, Paul does not conceive of humankind as  
particular individuals whose volitional actions determine their  
destiny. Instead he conceives of humanity as a single entity. “Into  
his mass of humanity Adam’s act injected sin as a power or force  
hostile to God, which in turn brings the reign of death.” In  
contrast to this, Christ’s obedience “injected righteousness as a  
power and with it the reign of life.” What is left unanswered in  
Romans 5, argues Grenz, is how individual persons participate in  
Adam’s sin and Christ’s obedience. Grenz is concerned to  
31Lewis and Demarest, Integrative Theology, II:223.  
32Lewis and Demarest, Integrative Theology, II:223-224.  
33Stanley J. Grenz, Theology for the Community of God , 203-204.  
ORIGINAL SIN, INFANT SALVATION, AND THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS • 61  
maintain the parallelism between Adam and Christ. “If Adam’s  
guilt is imputed to all, then fairness demands that Christ’s  
righteousness be as well.”34 The answer actually comes elsewhere  
in the Epistle where the apostle makes clear that God bestows  
righteousness on those united to Christ by faith. Similarly,  
individuals come under the power of death—the death  
introduced into the world by Adam’s sin—through their own  
“personal sin.” Grenz thus concludes that the case for “original  
guilt” is not strong.35  
Grenz does affirm original sin in the sense of inherited  
corruption or depravity. He likens our inheriting of a depraved  
nature with our inheriting of other basic traits; in fact, they come  
to us in the same way. Wishing to steer clear of a purely Pelagian  
notion of original sin, Grenz states that the source of our sinful  
nature is not limited to the external environment; rather, our  
sinful attitudes and actions spring forth from “the inner core of  
our being, from the human heart.” Meanwhile we derive our  
corrupt nature from our ancestors, going back to our first  
parents. Yet Grenz also wishes to recognize a social factor: “We  
teach each other to sin.”36 Thus, given both of these factors,  
“Each of us will and does sin, once we are in a position to reflect  
moral choices in action and thereby to act out what is present  
within our nature by heredity and socialization.”37  
For Grenz, however, guilt is not part of what constitutes  
original sin, which is to say, depravity alone is not indicative of  
guilt and condemnation. Scripture declares that God judges us  
according to our works (Jer. 17:9-10; Rom. 2:6), which means we  
are not condemned for a fallen nature but for sinful actions.  
Indeed, all humans miss the mark either willfully or passively.38  
The question still remains as to the time and point at which  
each individual actually begins to participate in humanity’s  
common failure. The best response, according to Grenz, is one  
34Grenz, Theology for the Community of God, 204-205.  
35Grenz, Theology for the Community of God, 205.  
36Grenz, Theology for the Community of God, 205.  
37Grenz, Theology for the Community of God, 206.  
38Grenz, Theology for the Community of God, 206.  
62 • MID-AMERICA JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY  
that realizes the potential present in all persons even from  
infancy to partake in the break-down of community, although the  
egocentric and self-absorbed survival characteristics of infancy do  
not entail “guilt.” This is not to say, however, that “the self-  
absorption of infancy” cannot ripen into “a community-  
destructive force within each of us—a depraved nature.” The  
inevitable consequence is that “this depraved nature expresses  
itself in moral choices that are either overly egotistical or overly  
self-abasing, and hence are displeasing to God.”39  
Grenz also queries whether the idea of condemnation can  
apply to persons who have not come through the process of  
normal human development, such as infants and the severely  
mentally retarded. He argues that only “our works” will form the  
basis for the final verdict.40  
Consequently, although all persons inherit a sinful disposition,  
only those who have given expression to the fallen nature  
through wrong moral choices stand under condemnation. The  
sentence falls only on those whose deeds mark them as guilty.  
On this basis, we conclude that persons who do not develop the  
moral potential do not fall under the eternal condemnation of  
the righteous God.41  
This fits with Jesus’ declaration that the kingdom belongs to  
children (Matt. 18:1-14; 19:14), for children are still in the stage  
of innocency and not yet in the stage of responsibility.  
“Somewhere in childhood we move from a stage in which our  
actions are not deemed morally accountable to the responsibility  
of acting as moral agents. In short, we cross a point which some  
refer to as the ‘age of accountability’.”42 Following A. H. Strong,  
Grenz acknowledges that infants are in a state of sin and need to  
be regenerated. What this means is that those who die in infancy,  
according to Strong, “are the object of special divine compassion  
39Grenz, Theology for the Community of God, 206.  
40Grenz, Theology for the Community of God, 208-209.  
41Grenz, Theology for the Community of God, 209.  
42Grenz, Theology for the Community of God, 209. Grenz cites Deut. 1:39,  
Num. 14:29-31, and Isa. 7:15-16.  
ORIGINAL SIN, INFANT SALVATION, AND THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS • 63  
and care, and through the grace of Christ are certain of  
salvation.”43  
We see then that for Grenz, as with Erickson and Lewis and  
Demarest, all persons who do not come to an age or mental state  
of accountability are not reckoned guilty in Adam’s sin, for  
though they inherit corruption and are inclined to sin, they do  
not inherit original guilt and have not committed a sinful act for  
which they are accountable. All such persons are therefore the  
objects of a distinctive sort of divine grace, coming to eternal  
blessedness through God’s peculiar saving actions.  
The Denial of Inherited Guilt and the Rejection  
of Infant Baptism  
The notion of original sin as set forth by these evangelical-  
Baptist authors has direct implications for the doctrine of  
baptism in general and infant baptism in particular. Given their  
rejection of original guilt (infants being infected only with an  
inherited pollution), it is not surprising that the Reformed  
doctrine of infant baptism is adjudged biblically out-of-bounds.  
Of course, the question of the meaning of baptism plays a  
significant role in the assessment of infant baptism as well. More  
will be said about that below. Here I observe that if infants and  
children, and more particularly, if the infants and children of  
believers, are considered to be without guilt, standing in no need  
of the remission of sin, indeed, having no sin of their own and in  
no way culpable with Adam, then the symbol of baptism (even as  
defined by Reformed writers) cannot legitimately be administered  
to them.44 It is nonsensical to administer the sign of baptism,  
signifying the washing away of sins, where no sin exists. Those  
43Augustus Hopkins Strong, Systematic Theology, 3 vols. (Philadelphia:  
Griffith and Rowland, 1907), 2:661.  
44It would seem that the mark of circumcision, prescribed in the Old  
Testament, is likewise misapplied if administered to “guiltless” children. On  
the import of circumcision, see John Murray, Christian Baptism, 44-48; and  
especially O. Palmer Robertson, The Christ of the Covenants (Phillipsburg, NJ:  
P&R, 1980), 147-166.  
64 • MID-AMERICA JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY  
who are not (yet) sinners do not qualify as candidates for full  
redemption. Consequently, they likewise do not qualify as  
candidates for the sign of that full redemption, namely baptism.  
Indeed, the symbol of washing is inappropriate for those who are  
not dirty.  
Baptist authors, however, typically assign a meaning to  
baptism that subverts the divine testimony and promissory  
character of the sacrament. Lewis and Demarest offer this  
comprehensive definition:  
(1) Ontologically, baptism signifies that the Holy Spirit has already  
renewed the human spirit’s capacities to know, love, and serve  
God. (2) Intellectually, baptism declares one’s assent to the  
Gospel’s objective truth for all and one’s subjective reception of  
it as true personally. (3) Volitionally, baptism manifests the  
person’s entire soul commitment to the crucified and risen  
Messiah. (4) Emotionally, baptism expresses one’s deep desire to  
love God with one’s whole being. (5) Ethically, baptism marks the  
transfer of one’s ultimate loyalty from the kingdom of darkness  
to the kingdom of light and to Christ as King. (6) Relationally, by  
being baptized, a person gives visible testimony to an invisible  
communion with the crucified and exalted Christ and to other  
members of the institution Christ heads, universally and locally.  
Through baptism a person expresses an initial public acceptance  
of both the privileges and the responsibilities of membership in  
that church.45  
Another contemporary Baptist author defines baptism as  
follows: Baptism is “the sign of the believer’s identification with  
the death, burial, and resurrection of Jesus; the outward sign of  
an inner cleansing or of the remission of sins; the sign of the  
eschatological resurrection of believers; the sign of the believer’s  
entry into the body of Christ; a testimony both to believers and  
to nonbelievers; and an act of obedience to Jesus Christ.”46 What  
is fundamental here is the conviction that baptism is a “token” or  
“an outward symbol”—serving as “a public testimony”—of what  
God has already effected in the person who believes in Jesus  
45Lewis and Demarest, Integrative Theology, II:286.  
46Garrett, Systematic Theology, II:529.  
ORIGINAL SIN, INFANT SALVATION, AND THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS • 65  
Christ.47 It “is the God-given means whereby we initially declare  
publicly our inward faith.”48 As a public testimony of rebirth, it is  
fitting that this sign should be reserved “for those who give  
evidence that that is actually true in their lives.”49  
What must not be missed in these definitions is that baptism  
is fundamentally a human testimony—it is the sign of the believer’s  
identification with Christ; baptism declares the believer’s assent to  
the gospel; it manifests the believer’s entire soul commitment to the  
risen Messiah; it marks the transfer of the believer’s loyalty from  
darkness to light; the believer gives visible testimony to an invisible  
communion with the Lord and offers an initial public acceptance  
of the duties of church membership. In short, baptism is the  
believer’s activity, an activity infants are incapable of performing.  
We see then that when baptism is defined in this way, infants  
are automatically disqualified as the proper recipients of the  
symbol. Indeed, by consigning the “ordinance” of baptism to a  
species of human testimony, coupled with an emasculated  
doctrine of original sin, the idea of infant baptism is rendered  
both unnecessary and ridiculous. But this scheme, in affirming  
the salvation of infants while despising the baptism of infants,  
meets with its own serious problems, as will become evident in  
what follows.  
Critique of the Evangelical-Baptist Consensus on  
Original Sin and Infant Salvation  
In the foregoing we have seen that, according to the  
consensus formed by these evangelical-Baptist writers, infants  
and others who have not attained the status of moral  
accountability participate in Adam’s sin in an attenuated manner,  
being infected with a corrupt nature but free from the guilt of  
Adam’s first sin. Since such persons are guiltless, they are under  
no penalty of sin, yet they still need deliverance from their  
inherited sinful condition. The Spirit’s regenerative operation is  
47Erickson, Christian Theology, 2nd ed., 1105.  
48Grenz, Theology for the Community of God, 529.  
49Grudem, Systematic Theology, 979.  
66 • MID-AMERICA JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY  
therefore necessary. Strictly speaking, however, the recipients of  
this restorative action are sinful only in being inclined to commit  
sin, for without reaching an age for making genuine moral  
decisions, their actions are born of a poisoned condition rather  
than a conscious desire. They are therefore neither guilty of sin  
nor under the penalty of eternal death. In short, their fallen state  
and need for salvation is understood in an attenuated way, which  
means that the need for divine redemption (and for baptism) is  
likewise conceived in an attenuated manner.  
“Somehow” Saved?  
Erickson, as we saw above, argues that all persons who fail to  
attain an age of moral competence are exempted from the guilt  
and consequent condemnation of original sin. Erickson speaks of  
children who die in infancy as participating in Adam’s sin, yet  
they “somehow” are accepted and saved. What is peculiar about  
this assertion is that while Erickson maintains that infants  
participate in Adam’s sin and therefore need salvation, he also  
argues that this participation is negated inasmuch as they have  
not consciously endorsed Adam’s sin. Guilt may be reckoned to  
infants only on condition they reach an age of responsibility and  
consciously sin themselves. In fact, Erickson emphatically steers  
away from the idea that children, so long as they are in their  
morally immature state, are to be regarded as sinful, condemned,  
and lost.  
We may ask, following Erickson, what it actually means to  
participate in Adam’s sin and need salvation. To answer that  
query exposes Erickson’s position as incoherent. For if children  
are not sinful, why do they need to be redeemed? If they are not  
lost, why do they need to be found? And if they are not  
condemned, why do they need to be justified? In light of what  
Erickson has written, it appears that infants do not in fact need  
redemption and justification. But what then does salvation mean  
in this framework? The incoherence of Erickson’s formulation is  
borne out by his use of the word “somehow.” Infants are  
“somehow” saved. The reason he uses such a word in referring  
to the salvation of infants is that they cannot exercise faith and  
ORIGINAL SIN, INFANT SALVATION, AND THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS • 67  
repentance and consequently cannot appropriate Christ. Erickson  
is emphatic: without a conscious and willful act of sin on the part  
of those who have become morally mature, guilt may not be  
imputed to individuals even if they have inherited corruption  
through Adam’s fall. Similarly, without a conscious act of faith on  
the part of believers, Christ’s righteousness may not be imputed  
to them. This means in the case of children who die in infancy  
that salvation has become a “somehow,” for nobody is  
automatically condemned or automatically saved.  
Meanwhile, there is no such thing as “unconscious sin,” just  
as there is no such thing as “unconscious faith”—which means,  
following Erickson’s scheme, children are not yet sinners in need of  
salvation. Instead, children are victims, subject to inherited  
corruption, needing rescue from that condition. According to  
Erickson, God in fact provides such rescue by way of  
regeneration, bringing deceased infants to perfection when he  
ushers them into glory. This takes place after the same manner  
that believers obtain perfection upon entering eternal glory. But  
we should observe that this is not salvation in the full New  
Testament sense of the term, involving expiation, propitiation,  
and remission of guilt. Rather, we may liken the salvation of  
children who die in infancy as analogous to the renewal of the  
created order itself. Just as the creation was subjected to  
frustration through Adam’s fall, infants and children likewise find  
themselves in the misery of this predicament. Similarly, as the  
created order awaits liberation from its bondage, groaning in the  
pains of childbirth, so those who are subjected to corruption  
through no fault of their own await deliverance in the way of  
regeneration and renewal (cf. Rom. 8:19-22). This in effect gives  
us an amended and significantly diluted notion of “sin” and of  
“sinner,” at least in the case of infants, and implicitly produces  
sinners of diverse sorts and salvation of different kinds.  
Two Types of Sinners, Two Types of Salvation  
Lewis and Demarest travel with Erickson along this  
trajectory. They speak of infants as involved in the universal  
curse of Adam’s sin. After all, infants are subject to the curse of  
68 • MID-AMERICA JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY  
sin, which is death, and to any number of other miseries. Yet they  
are exempted from “the eternal penalty,” for they are not capable  
of the transgressions which would eternally alienate them from  
God. They are free from “imputed condemnation.” Similarly,  
since infants are incapable of faith and repentance, the saving  
benefits of Christ’s redemptive work come to them by way of  
“special application.” This is not salvation from sins as such, that  
is, from sins for which they must repent, for they have not  
responsibly committed any sins. This is not salvation from guilt  
and condemnation. Rather, this is salvation from corruption. In  
other words, all children who die before coming to an age of  
moral responsibility are pardoned of their sinful nature. Meanwhile,  
children as such cannot be under the curse of eternal death, for  
they have not yet transitioned to a state of personal guilt. They  
are not yet actual sinners in need of a full-orbed salvation.  
Nonetheless, Lewis and Demarest wish to maintain that children  
who die before reaching moral responsibility are “saved” by way  
of a special application of redemption. It is a special application  
since children are incapable of faith and repentance. Thus  
children need a special kind of salvation.  
But here a problem is manifest. In waging their polemics  
against the doctrine of original guilt, Lewis and Demarest, despite  
their assertions to the contrary, speak of sin and salvation in an  
equivocal manner and implicitly posit two types of sinners and  
therefore two types of salvation. Sinners of the first sort are those  
who stand guilty before God, having committed personal and  
willful sin. They are subject to sin’s penalty for their own sins,  
which involves physical and spiritual death as the divine curse  
upon sin. As “guilty” sinners they need the remedy of Christ’s  
expiatory sacrifice—that is, they need Christ’s vicarious sacrifice  
on the cross as the remedy for the liability that accrues to them  
because of their individual sins. As their Substitute, Christ bears  
their guilt and pays the penalty that is upon the guilty.50 However,  
following the theological construct of these authors, they  
50Lewis and Demarest, Integrative Theology, II:401-408; Erickson, Christian  
Theology, 2nd ed., 828-840; Grenz, Theology for the Community of God, 345-353;  
Grudem, Systematic Theology, 570-81.  
ORIGINAL SIN, INFANT SALVATION, AND THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS • 69  
implicitly put forward another and second class of sinner. Sinners  
of this second sort stand before God without guilt. Although they  
are subject to the corruption or depravity of original sin, until  
they reach an age of moral accountability they do not sin willfully  
or knowingly and therefore are not guilty of sin even if their  
behavior is not strictly in conformity to the law in all respects.  
Because of their inherited corruption, they are born with the  
inclination to sin—a wicked propensity that will inevitably  
manifest itself upon reaching moral maturity. Thus, even in the  
state of infancy such individuals stand in need of deliverance  
from their corrupt condition. But they do not need salvation  
understood as rescue from divine wrath or as the expiation of  
guilt. This class of sinner is guilty neither of Adam’s sin nor of  
personal sin.  
A gross inconsistency is evident in this position. While  
advocates for believer’s baptism maintain that faith is the  
necessary prerequisite of salvation and argue vigorously against  
the permissibility of infant baptism since infants cannot exercise  
or evidence faith, nonetheless they reckon all infants in a state of  
“salvation”—that is, salvation of the second type, for they are not  
yet condemnable. This is salvation apart from faith. Those who die  
before reaching a state of accountability are, apart from faith,  
brought to the same state of eternal bliss that is promised to  
those who are saved from eternal condemnation as sinners guilty  
before God. These advocates of believer’s baptism, in positing a  
doctrine of infant salvation, put forward a doctrine of salvation  
that is apart from belief.  
But who is the agent of this salvation? Why need Christ be  
this agent? Or another why of asking these questions: How is  
Christ’s sacrifice relevant to this kind of salvation?  
Diverse Grounds of Salvation?  
Questions of this sort are sharpened when we focus upon the  
ground of salvation. Grenz asserts that God regenerates those  
whom he knows will die in infancy. Apparently Grenz wishes to  
distinguish regenerate infants from unregenerate infants—the  
former God regenerates because he foreknows that they will die  
70 • MID-AMERICA JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY  
in infancy, the latter God leaves in an unregenerate state because  
he foreknows that they will reach moral maturity and transition  
to a stage of personal moral guilt. This however does not address  
what “status” infants have before God prior to death or prior to  
transitioning to a state of condemnation.51  
According to Grenz, in regenerating dying infants God  
performs a work of special divine compassion and care. While  
this work may exhibit special divine compassion and care, it is  
not a work born out of Christ’s sacrificial death on the cross.  
Grenz, in line with Erickson as well as Lewis and Demarest,  
argues that persons are not condemned for a fallen nature but for  
their own sinful actions. Only those who have committed wrong  
moral choices stand under condemnation, which means all others  
are free from this verdict. If infants are free from eternal  
condemnation, then the divine rescue that comes to them is not  
gracious, though it is compassionate. But even this compassion  
seems to arise from obligation. God must regenerate those whom  
he knows will die in infancy, otherwise he would unjustly punish  
those who are not guilty and consequently not worthy of (eternal)  
51This is a recurring and problematic feature of the scheme these authors  
present. What is the status of infants prior to death? Are we to regard all  
infants as “saved” until they transition (through personal sin) to guilt and  
condemnation? If so, it appears that death has become a superior remedy for  
the human condition than the cross. In fact, death becomes an instrument of  
salvation and curse becomes a blessing. In short, for infants, salvation  
becomes salvation “by death alone.” However, if we do not regard all infants  
as “saved,” another option would be to regard all infants as “damned”—in  
which case, only death brings the verdict of salvation. Indeed, Lewis and  
Demarest suggest that infant death is indicative of divine election. But it is  
askew and even mistaken to regard infants as “damned” following the  
paradigm of these authors. For until infants mature and commit personal sin,  
they are without guilt before God and under no condemnation. Neither of  
these options looks very promising. A third option would require us to  
consider infants as neither saved nor damned, but floating in a kind of  
(Protestant style) limbus infantum, being neither in Adam (and condemned) nor  
in Christ (and saved). But such a notion is wildly speculative and has no more  
biblical support than the Roman Catholic version of limbus infantum whereby  
infants are damned in being denied a vision of God but delivered from  
physical torment. Rome, however, no longer officially holds to this view, see  
Catechism of the Catholic Church, art. 1261.  
ORIGINAL SIN, INFANT SALVATION, AND THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS • 71  
condemnation. In this way, if God is to remain just and righteous  
in all his actions, his regenerating dying infants has become an act  
of necessity. But if this is so, the word salvation has been  
stretched to the breaking point. For salvation is a grace-word. If  
God must regenerate infants whom he knows will die before  
reaching moral maturity, then the “salvation” these children  
experience is no longer of grace.  
Lewis and Demarest manifest this problem in a slightly  
different way. They speak of a salvation that, by way of  
exception, does not require faith and repentance. According to  
their scheme, the exception applies not because there are  
different grounds of salvation—one for infants who die, and  
another for adults—but because infants are incapable of  
committing sin and of exercising faith. The ground of salvation  
remains the same for all persons. But this claim cannot bear up  
when scrutinized. The grounds of salvation must be diverse since  
the reasons for needing salvation are diverse. To be sure, Lewis  
and Demarest may legitimately argue that the agent of salvation  
remains the same. But clearly the need for salvation is different in  
the case of morally guilty adults over against morally guiltless  
children, which makes the ground or basis of salvation different.  
For in the case of adults, Christ’s saving work must answer the  
problem of personal guilt, whereas in the case of infants his work  
of salvation need not address that problem—no such guilt exists.  
Lewis and Demarest argue that infants need “pardon” for their  
sinful natures. Pardon is a word that assumes the idea of guilt and  
involves forgiveness. But, given the scheme Lewis and Demarest  
set up, how are infants guilty for their fallen nature since they did  
not consciously choose to inherit that nature? If sin and guilt  
require conscious choice, as Lewis and Demarest maintain (along  
with Erickson and Grenz), then children do not need to be  
pardoned for possessing such a nature. Rather, at most, they need  
to be rescued from the entanglements of that nature. But if that  
is true, the ground of salvation shifts from sacrifice for guilt to a  
restorative act by divine fiat. Upon death, God delivers infants  
from their corrupt condition by a re-creative act of regeneration.  
This act, however, is not (as noted above) grounded in grace, in  
72 • MID-AMERICA JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY  
undeserved favor, for infants who die are not guilty of sin and  
therefore they are not worthy of condemnation. On the contrary,  
this act is incumbent upon God inasmuch as he would be unjust  
to condemn those who are not guilty of sin. Thus Lewis and  
Demarest (like Grenz) give us a notion of salvation that, as it  
applies to dying infants, entails a necessary divine act of  
restoration. But why would the cross be an ingredient in this  
recipe of salvation? Atonement hardly seems necessary. Despite  
what these authors assert to the contrary, the ground of salvation  
is indeed different in the case of infants than in the case of adults.  
The difference is nothing less than deliverance from guilt and  
divine wrath.  
The Injustice of Guiltless Suffering  
A further inconsistency is evident as well, for it is not clear  
why infants should come under any condemnation at all, eternal or  
temporal. In other words, if inherited guilt is denied, why is  
temporal condemnation merited while eternal condemnation is  
not? What sins have infants committed? Indeed, what guilt bears  
upon them? If they are not worthy of condemnation, how are  
they subjects of salvation?  
These opponents of infant baptism, in advocating a doctrine  
of universal infant salvation, find themselves arguing for a  
position that is hopelessly inconsistent. For they contend that  
God would be unjust to punish eternally those who have not  
committed personal sin. Yet they maintain that these same guiltless  
individuals may suffer sin’s temporal penalties. Infants and young  
children then are created to suffer the curse of death for no sin of  
their own—a curse that includes agonizing disease, lingering  
illness, debilitating injury, emotional and physical abuse, and the  
ravages of famine, plague, and pestilence. This is a self-  
contradictory stance. If infants and children are not worthy of  
punishment, why should they suffer any temporal penalties? If  
they are not guilty in and with Adam, so that Adam’s sin has not  
been imputed to them, then even the temporal retributions they  
endure are unfair and impermissible.  
ORIGINAL SIN, INFANT SALVATION, AND THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS • 73  
This problem is further exhibited in the nature of death itself,  
for death is the key ingredient of curse. If infants and children are  
unworthy of suffering eternal death, not needing rescue from  
divine wrath, how are they, being guiltless, under the curse of  
death—even temporal death?  
According to these evangelical-Baptist proponents of infant  
salvation, while baptizing covenant children is regarded as  
presumptuous and harmful, all children are declared guiltless  
before God—a privileged status Lewis and Demarest seem to  
extend to youth up to twenty years of age. They further declare  
all children free from a state of condemnation until each child  
individually transitions to a condemned status through personal  
sin. Nonetheless, as just noted, prior to committing personal sin,  
these children are subject to sin’s curse. Thus advocates of  
believer’s baptism allow guiltless infants to suffer all the maladies  
of original sin with one exception—if they die in their guiltless  
state, God is obliged to deliver them from eternal death. It is  
hard to see how this paradigm protects the justice of God.  
To be sure, in denying inherited guilt, or the imputation of  
Adam’s first sin to infants, it is precisely the justice of God that  
these authors wish to safeguard. But the paradigm they present to  
replace the various Reformed constructions of original sin is, as  
has become evident, permeated with numerous problems and  
inconsistencies, including the problem of innocent suffering. For,  
if children are without personal sin and guilt, then they have not  
merited the suffering they are made to endure. This is nothing  
other than unjust suffering.  
It is evident that these Baptist authors have not established a  
just and necessary connection between the miserable state of  
children and the guiltless status children have before God, for  
Grenz and Erickson suggest that children who have not  
committed personal sin are not properly speaking sinners.  
Advocates of the Augustinian doctrine of original sin or the  
federalist scheme on the other hand, in viewing children as  
participants in Adam’s sin, corrupted and guilty, have a much  
better explanation for the suffering and death of infants, not to  
mention a much better explanation as to how the sacrifice of  
74 • MID-AMERICA JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY  
Christ’s full redemptive work applies to those whom God has  
declared recipients of his promised salvation in Christ. In fact,  
because a certain class of infants falls within the scope of this  
promised salvation, these infants also qualify for the sign and seal  
of that promise, that is, the sacrament of baptism.  
Final Observations  
In the foregoing we have seen that certain Baptist writers  
reject the doctrine of infant baptism, in part, by positing a  
doctrine of original sin that frees infants and children from  
Adam’s guilt. In this way, infants and children do not stand in  
need of the full redemptive accomplishment of Christ’s sacrifice  
on the cross. In fact, it is not evident that such individuals need  
the cross at all. Although they do need restoration, they do not  
need Christ’s expiatory and propitiatory sacrifice inasmuch as  
personal guilt may not be reckoned to them. Given this model,  
infants and children are not the proper objects of salvation in the  
full biblical sense of the term and therefore they are not the  
proper subjects of the sign of baptism.  
We have seen that this model or paradigm is not without  
serious problems, for not only is the idea of salvation treated in  
an equivocal manner—the ground of salvation being different for  
children than for adults—but the instrumentality of faith likewise  
acquires a different role in these diverse schemes of salvation,  
being necessary for adults but unnecessary for children. This is a  
peculiar stance to take given the sharp polemic Baptist  
theologians wage against infant baptism and the inability of  
infants to exercise faith. Only by positing two types of sinners  
and therefore two types of salvation—even if this is posited only  
implicitly—are these writers able to make sense of their paradigm  
as an alternative to the Augustinian or federalist models.  
We have also seen that the problem of guiltless suffering  
emerges as a prominent and perplexing problem in this model.  
God’s justice is not protected by arguing for universal infant  
salvation. On the contrary, insofar as infants are subject to the  
ORIGINAL SIN, INFANT SALVATION, AND THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS • 75  
universality of the curse, including death itself, their suffering is  
unjust if they are reckoned as guiltless.  
Although Baptist theologians have alleged that the doctrine  
of infant baptism was a practice in search of a theology, it seems  
instead that contemporary advocates of believer’s baptism have  
been in search of a diluted doctrine of original sin for children.  
By allowing infants and children to escape the guilt of Adam’s  
sin, the morally immature stand guiltless before God and come to  
“salvation” apart from faith. Meanwhile, since faith figures so  
prominently in the Baptist conception of baptism, only believers  
may be baptized as a testimony to their rebirth and faith in  
Christ. Indeed, why baptize persons unless they have faith in  
Christ? In this way the salvation of infants is affirmed while the  
sign of salvation (baptism) is administered only to those who  
exercise faith. This brings forth the inevitable question: How are  
children who die at a young age, before coming to faith, saved  
apart from faith? According to Erickson and Grenz, along with  
Lewis and Demarest, since infants and children are without  
personal guilt, they do not need “faith” in Christ. They simply  
need to be ushered to glory and made new. Thus, proponents of  
universal infant salvation have yielded the principle that salvation  
belongs only to those who embrace Christ by faith. We should  
note however that if salvation is no longer strictly administered to  
those who can exercise responsible faith, then it seems quite  
unreasonable to withhold the symbol of salvation from those  
who enjoy this status. But such is the scheme these authors  
present in opposition to the Reformed model.  
Naturally, the Reformed model of original sin, with its  
vigorous doctrine of imputed guilt, paints a different portrait of  
infant sinners. According to the Reformed model, infants and  
children are sinners from birth, sinful from conception, and  
therefore under the judgment of God. Consequently, they stand  
in need of redemption as fully as adults do, for they are estranged  
from God and at enmity with him. They are corrupt and guilty,  
sinfully warped and accountable for their sin-and-sinfulness in  
Adam. Thus, so long as Adam is their head and they remain  
outside of Christ, they are under the curse of eternal  
76 • MID-AMERICA JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY  
condemnation and death. They cannot enter the kingdom of God  
unless they are born again. Infant sinners need cleansing and  
forgiveness, which means they need Christ’s atoning sacrifice for  
the remission of their sins. They also need the indwelling of the  
Holy Spirit, for their lives will not proceed along the path of  
repentance and faith in Christ except through rebirth. This  
means, then, that if any class of children are recipients of the  
divine promise of salvation, such that they are savable and in fact  
saved only by the saving operation of Christ and his Spirit, then  
they are likewise the proper subjects of the sign and seal of that  
salvation, baptism.  
Contrary to the assertions of these Baptist theologians,  
infants and children find themselves under the curse of sin as  
Adam’s children—the curse of eternal death! Indeed, Scripture  
reveals that they are under the penalty of sin. If this were not so,  
they would be exempted from the condition of sin itself. What is  
more, if all children alike were free from sin’s curse, particularly  
the guilt of sin, then it would be inappropriate for God to  
distinguish the children of believers from the children of  
unbelievers and to grant a privileged status to the former and not  
the latter. Yet Scripture shows us that God consistently does this  
very thing.  
. During the flood, Noah and his children are spared the  
punishment of the universal deluge, whereas unbelievers and  
their children come under the divine judgment. The children  
of unbelief, with their parents, perish (Gen. 7:21-23).  
. Circumcision, a mark applied to believers and to their male-  
infant offspring, carried the import of inclusion in the  
covenant community of God’s gracious favor and blessing, as  
well as the need for cleansing and the actual removal of  
defilement (Exod. 6:12; Lev. 19:23; 26:41; Deut. 10:16; 30:6;  
Jer. 4:4; 6:10; 9:25). This mark clearly distinguished children  
who were the objects of God’s favor and kindness from  
children who were under the sentence of death.  
ORIGINAL SIN, INFANT SALVATION, AND THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS • 77  
. The curse upon the firstborn of Egypt included infants (cf.  
Exod. 11:4-7; 12:12, 29-30). The firstborn of Israel, however,  
were unharmed by the judgment of death, sharing with their  
parents the mark of the blood of the lamb (cf. Exod. 12:13).  
. During the period of the conquest, those under the sacral ban  
(cherem)—that is, those under the penalty of God’s righteous  
judgment and devoted to complete annihilation—included  
the children of unbelievers (Num. 21:21-35; Deut. 2:34; 3:6;  
7:2; 20:16, 17; Josh. 6:21; 7:24-25; 8:24). They were not  
spared. Thus we see that a principle of inclusion applies: the  
children of unbelievers are included in the divine curse;  
however, the children of believers are included in the divine  
blessing.  
. The children of believers are regarded as holy—even when  
there is only one believing parent (1 Cor. 7:14). Such an  
affirmation is irrelevant—even inappropriate—if all children  
share the same status of guiltlessness before God. Indeed,  
how are the children of believers holy if all children alike are  
free from personal guilt and condemnation? What is more, if  
God is obliged to save all children who die in infancy, then  
what distinguishes one infant from another is not the faith or  
unbelief of the parents, and not whether an infant  
participates in the divine promise of salvation, but whether  
death comes upon a child prior to reaching the age of  
accountability. The divine promise of Acts 2:39 is rendered  
null and void in this scheme. The salvation of children, being  
a salvation apart from faith, is dependent upon death.  
Holiness, then, is determined by death, not by the covenant-  
promise of God.  
The Reformed conception of original sin likewise offers a  
superior answer to the question regarding the status of infants  
prior to death. In fact, the Reformed answer to this question has  
direct bearing on the question of infant baptism.  
As noted earlier, since all children are both corrupt and guilty  
in Adam, they need divine redemption fully as much as adults do.  
78 • MID-AMERICA JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY  
This means that all persons find themselves either in Adam (and  
condemned) or in Christ (and saved). There is no status  
independent of these two heads of humanity—it is either Adam  
or Christ. The question, then, is under whose headship children  
come. Are they in Adam or in Christ?  
The authors we examined above cannot give an unequivocal  
answer to this question. Clearly, each of them wishes to say that  
all persons are in Adam with respect to the corruption of sin. But  
corruption does not automatically render a person guilty and  
condemnable. Thus infants, should they die before reaching an  
age of moral accountability, find themselves candidates of a kind  
of requisite divine mercy to rescue them from their inherited  
corruption. Meanwhile, if their inherited corruption is left  
unchecked and allowed to progress, it will bear its inevitable  
fruits and come to ratify Adam’s sin, whereby guilt is incurred  
and there is a transition from guiltlessness to a state of guilt.  
Infants as such, however, are not worthy of damnation since they  
are not culpable for any sin.  
But, as already observed, according to the scheme set forth  
by these authors infants appear to be neither in Adam nor in  
Christ. And this again illustrates what is implicit in their position:  
there are two kinds of sinners and therefore two kinds of  
salvation. Similarly, given their attenuated doctrine of original sin,  
along with their equivocal statements regarding the status of  
infants before God, it is easy to see why children fail to qualify as  
candidates for baptism. Yet, ironically, they do qualify as  
candidates for a thinned down variety of “salvation”—a salvation  
that is apart from expiation and propitiation. Following the path  
of these authors, it is not clear that Christ is responsible for the  
salvation of infants. In fact, the cross seems superfluous.  
The Reformed position recognizes that all persons are  
polluted and guilty in Adam, subject to eternal condemnation,  
and needful of the divine rescue that only Christ can give. Only  
those who are the recipients of the divine promise of salvation in  
Christ find deliverance from their sinful state and the remission  
of their sins.  
ORIGINAL SIN, INFANT SALVATION, AND THE BAPTISM OF INFANTS • 79  
Insofar as any child (or for that matter, any person) is in  
possession of the reality and substance of salvation—that is,  
Christ himself—it is inappropriate to withhold salvation’s sign  
and seal from him. We must remember that that which is  
signified by the sign is always greater than the sign itself. Christ  
and the salvation he bestows are greater than the sign of baptism  
which depicts and portrays salvation. Similarly, the forgiveness of  
sins and being made alive in Christ are greater than the rite  
announcing and promising those blessings. Since the children of  
believers are counted as those to whom the promise of salvation  
is directed and for whom it applies, it is altogether fitting and  
necessary that these children receive the sign and seal that  
testifies to their status in Christ as children of promise. In short, in  
possessing Christ, they must be baptized.  
We see then that given the Reformed understanding of  
baptism’s import and the inclusive nature of the divine promise  
of salvation, embracing believers and their seed, the mark of that  
salvation—baptism—is rightly and necessarily administered to  
them. For it is beyond dispute that the gracious blessings of  
salvation are extended to them: the washing away of sin, the  
remission of guilt, rebirth, and new life in Christ. This new life in  
Christ—salvation—stands in stark contrast to the former life in  
Adam. To deny the sign of baptism to those who are identified  
with Christ undermines the divine intention in ordaining the sign.  
Our examination of contemporary Baptist authors has  
demonstrated that the polemic against infant baptism involves  
more than issues of baptism’s import and mode. In back of these  
issues is the question of original guilt and its consequences. We  
have shown that those who are guilty in Adam need the remedy  
that comes only in the second Adam, Christ the Lord, the remedy  
that saves infants as well. Indeed, those who are united with  
Christ, according to divine promise, are the objects of God’s  
saving mercy and so likewise the proper subjects of baptism—  
believers and their children.